The Sahel region; assessing progress twenty-five
years after the great drought
Simon Batterbury
A shorter version is in The
Geographical (London)
May 1998.
Before issues of global warming, ozone depletion or acid rain became
important objects of scientific study and international concern, the Sahel region came to represent what Claude Raynaut called "the quintessence of a major
environmental emergency" following major episodes of drought and food
shortages in the 1970s. The so-called environmental emergency has two
components; periods of drought, and localized environmental degradation that
together have been sufficiently grave severely to curtail agricultural
production and livestock numbers. The rich culture and history of this African
region has, sadly, become linked in public consciousness to stories of food
insecurity and social vulnerability.
The Sahel forms the southern edge of the Saharan
desert, passing at least 4,500km from Senegal
through Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso,
Niger, and Chad, and
blends seamlessly into the slightly less arid Sudano-Sahel
belt to its southern edge. The 50 million people of the Sahel pursue diverse livelihood strategies
including agriculture, livestock herding, fishing, short and long-distance
trading, and a variety of urban occupations. Farming in this region is almost
entirely reliant on three months of summer rainfall, except along the banks of
the major rivers, lakes, and other seasonal water courses. Cities were one the
seats of empires, the crossing-points for trade, and sites of learning. Timbuktou, situated on the banks of the Niger, was the capital of the Songhai empire in the 1500s and
the site of the fabled Islamic university
of Sankoré,
and it was not captured for the French until 1894. The colonisation
of the Sahel was largely carried out by the French
army, who were closely followed by adventurous traders and missionaries like France's
"White Monks", the Pères Blancs under the infamous Cardinal Lavigerie.
Together with a cadre of bureaucrats, they helped to enlarge the early native
settlements and fortified posts into the administrative, cultural and economic centres we know today; Dakar, Bamako, Ouagadougou, Bobo Dioulassou, Niamey and Kano (Nigeria's northern metropolis, taken by the British).
These and other settlements now have good road connections, and there are
examples of market gardening and intensive agricultural production that feed
the growing urban populations. Transport systems are, however, patchy; there
are only three main railway lines, and many smaller towns have been linked to
the cities by metalled roads only since the 1980s.
The Niger and Senegal rivers
have provided transport arteries for centuries.
Researchers studying the Sahel
today focus on the regions' continued economic fragility, its halting steps
towards democratic political regimes, and its continued food security problems.
Despite complex economic migration patterns and urban expansion in the 20th
century, the vast majority of the region's rural dwellers are dependent on some
form of rain-fed agriculture or animal production. Some suggest that there are
no "normal" rainfall levels in this region; just fluctuating supplies
and changing human demand for water. Three major droughts have occurred this
century, in 1910-1916, 1941-1945, and a long period of below average rainfall
(termed 'desiccation') that began in the late-1960s and continued, with some
interruptions, into the the 1980s. Absolute minimum
rainfall level were recorded at many stations in 1983
and 1984. The period of poor rainfall in the 1970s struck particularly hard for
many Sahelian farmers and pastoralists, when there
were an estimated 100,000 drought-related deaths.
The hazardous conditions of the droughts of the 1970s, and those that
followed, have had cumulative impacts, but these impacts form part of complex
patterns of social and economic change, and it is almost impossible to separate
the effects of the natural hazard (drought) from other factors that made
individuals vulnerable. Vulnerability is an everyday situation for some people,
but a rare occurrence for others. It is important here to differentiate between
meteorological drought - below-average moisture supply - and the effects of
changing human land uses and practices. Low rainfall can be coped with, if
farmers have a diverse livelihood systems, or sufficient assets. Famine
situations have resulted in dryland West Africa where
drought conditions have surprised populations that were unprepared for them (as
in the 1970s, when fifteen years of good rainfall had encouraged many to
over-invest in agriculture); and where the possible range of adjustments have
been constrained by warfare, social status, or corruption and mismanagement. In
some areas people starved without drought conditions, because of locust
invasions, epidemics, or the seizure of their harvests by warlords or even
colonial administrators.
Sahelian droughts and their effects have been
studied intensively since the 1970s, as part of the international response to
"environmental emergency". It is only in the last ten years, however,
that the long-term impacts of the famines of the 1970s have become evident.
Those events provoked a re-thinking of the links between population growth,
drought, and socio-political change, and also helped to re-focus development
policy away from expensive and unsuccessful "interventions" towards
more considerate schemes targeted at boosting local capacities. Since the 1970s
the Sahelian nations have also witnessed an abrupt
economic transformation involving increases in migration, international trade,
and links to the international development aid system.
Despite slow starts, since the early 1970s the international community has
acquired an increasing capability to prevent the onset of drought-induced food
shortages. Early warning systems are one aspect of this. These provide the data
necessary to predict or assess potential crop loss and animal shortfalls, based
partly on remotely-sensed data of vegetation cover and rainfall patterns and
partly on food market surveys. The FEWS
(Famine Early Warning System) developed by the American aid programme
(USAID) for example, alerts policymakers and governments to rapid price hikes
for the staple foods at local markets, and unusual land cover changes, that may signal an impending food shortage. But
responding to these warnings has been more difficult, and the record of food
distribution in famine situations by donors and governments has been chequered. While the provision of adequate grain reserves
in affected areas has been helped with the establishment of national cereals
boards in most Sahelian nations, and eased by road
construction into the remoter rural areas, national financial resources are
frequently inadequate to maintain food reserves. Rural dwellers still have to
pay for government grain except in times of extreme famine, and not all
households may be able to pay even a subsidised
price. In the 1990s, private traders have taken over much of the burden of
grain provision and prices now float according to supply and demand, with less
government intervention. In the canton of Hamdallaye,
a market centre that serves a hinterland of Zarma
villages in south west Niger, market prices fluctuate considerably on a monthly
basis, and have actually risen at well above inflation rates since the start of
the 1980s when the government scaled down its grain programme.
Fred Pearce of the New Scientist summarises the
situation thus: "Across the Sahel,
most countries now have sufficient grain most years. It doesn't always get to
the poorest inhabitants any more than Porches "trickle down" to the
poor. But it is there. Often, with no thanks to
governments".
Another group of proposed adjustments were focused on working with the human
and drought-induced stress on natural ecosystems, by supporting only modest
increases in the production of foodstuffs and livestock numbers but, at the
same time, improving the resilience of these systems to "bad years"
of drought or other hazards. Resilience may be boosted by encouraging soil and
water conservation, agro-forestry, and stocks of fodder for livestock.
Locally-based efforts to nurture and protect the resource base are a feature of
many development initiatives in the Sahel
today, and a flourishing of local interest these schemes owes much to the
international concern first raised in the 1970s. The premise was that, if
rainfall was unreliable, then what fell should be captured and used more
effectively. There are now thousands of farmer cooperatives, small-scale NGO
projects, internationally funded development projects and programmes
involved in environmental rehabilitation, soil and water conservation, and
other forms of support to rural people. Classic cases are found on the Central
Plateau of Burkina Faso, occupied by the Mossi
people. The Plateau, which straddles the Sahel and Sudano-Sahel zones, is a "laboratory" for some of
the most innovative techniques in soil and water conservation and agroforestry in dryland Africa. Contour stone lines (diguettes)
built by farmers and consisting of lines of stones and rocks placed across the
land contour, are cheap and popular erosion control methods and are much
publicized by development organisations like OXFAM
and GTZ (German
development aid). These are built to slow the erosive overland flow from summer
rains and to capture water where it is needed by the growing crops, as well as
to increase the deposition of sediments rich in soil nutrients, also of benefit
to crops and trees. These systems were developed by European volunteers and
farmers experimenting together, and they are transforming the landscape around
hundreds of villages. Stone lines and other conservation works are now highly
visible features of the contemporary rural landscape. They are not miracle cures,
however, and are of most assistance to farmers who own their own land. Much
more applied research and collaboration with farmers is required on these
techniques.
A third group of proposed adjustments were focused on improved production
technologies, such as higher-yielding drought-resistant crops, irrigation, or
improved ranching and grazing schemes. The record here is less good, and as the
FEWS project notes, "hopes for a Green Reolution
in the Sahel have
faded". Plant breeding and technological development by organizations like
ICRISAT (the International Crops
Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics, with a laboratory outside Niamey in Niger)
has created improved varieties of millet and sorghum, the two staple foodgrains. These generally require more moisture than
local varieties, and more fertilizer and pesticides. Without these inputs - so
difficult to afford in the present economic climate - yield increase rarely
seem to compensate for increased costs to farmers. The "development and
transfer of technology to the farmer" - part of ICRISAT's
mandate, and the focus of several American-funded projects in the 1970s and
1980s - seems to have faltered. The largest effort to overcome national food defecits was the Authorité
des Aménagements des Vallées
des Voltas (AVV) scheme in southern Burkina Faso, which resettled thousands of
farmers from the densely settled northern areas of Burkina Faso in the fertile river
valleys in the south and west of the country. These sparsely populated lands
were opened up for settlement by a massive river-blindness eradication program
in the 1970s. Settlers were allocated plots, received start-up assistance, and
were asked to adopt a package of improved seed varieties and intensive
cultivation techniques. After 25 years, there is little evidence of sustainable
intensification of agriculture in the AVV, although the scheme has certainly
provided new land and new options for some farmers.
A fourth group of changes set in motion by the environmental emergencies of
the 1970s involve a re-structuring of the Sahel's
place in Africa and the world. The drought,
when it received popular attention, helped initiate some longer-term
externally-aided projects that might not otherwise have been supported. Readers
may recall seeing BBC television documentaries about a team of British
celebrities playing soccer against local teams in Burkina Faso in 1997, in order to
raise money for the charity, Comic Relief.
But the changes go much deeper. Over the last twenty-five years, national
governments have attempted to 'catch up' with their more affluent and
progressive neighbors through investment in basic industries, power supply,
agricultural exports, mining, transportation networks and healthcare - funded
in large part by foreign aid. Structural Adjustment programmes
for macro-economic recovery, that impose special conditions on the recipient
countries, have (as elsewhere in Africa) had
mixed results. An over-inflated and inefficient public administration has been
trimmed back under these programmes, but
entrepreneurship and 'market forces' have not, and perhaps will not, improve qulity of life and economic conditions for the majority of Sahelian peoples. For example in Niger,
currently the Sahel's poorest nation, a severe economic crisis and political
instability has been compounded by the withdrawal by most aid donors in the mid
1990s. The lack of financial resources has mean rural schooling, healthcare,
and agricultural extension services (once funded by government export of
uranium reserves, when prices for that product were higher) have virtually
ground to a halt. Burkina
Faso, by contrast, has a healthier economy
and it is experiencing an 'aid boom'. It exports green beans to Paris, and dried tomatoes and mangos to British health food outlets.
But questions are being raised about its focus on improving its export
potential and economic growth, rather than on supporting its skilled and
innovative subsistence farmers and pastoralists.
Lastly, is it important to note that rural populations have responded to all
these fast-changing conditions through increasing mobility.
Rural population in the Sahel
could easily double in the next thirty years. Some see this as a major problem,
given the likely limit to home-grown food supplies. Others, like Mike Mortimore - a British geographer who has studied farming
systems in Northern Nigeria for thirty years -
say that much of the region is "underpopulated,
not overpopulated", and more people are needed for soil and water
conservation and agricultural labour - "more
hands to work and more brains to think", says Fred Pearce. Migration to
new regions, or temporary movements to find paid work, have allowed Sahelian populations to "breathe" where that are
faced with drought, land pressures, and poor soil quality, according to the Club du Sahel. It is common to find the majority of young men
from Sahelian villages "en exode" (on economic migration, mainly to the
cities and coastal areas) in the dry season when farming activities are
minimal. Some ethnic groups, like the Tuareg and the Peul, are traditionally mobile in rural space. But it is
common to see farmers, from groups including the Mossi
and Hausa, moving to new areas of low population density including eastern or
south-west Burkina Faso,
as land becomes scarce back home. The Club du Sahel also predict a growing urban
population for the region; across all of West Africa,
thirty cities will achieve populations of a million people or more by 2020.
There are only six at the present time. The region is unlikely to develop a
strong indigenous manufacturing sector, thus splitting urban employment between
the thousands of remaining government employees (the functionnaires)
and a thriving informal sector.
Into the future
The changes currently under way in the Sahel region remind us that,
for all the influence of political and economic restructuring on everyday
lives, the natural environment still plays a major part in determining who
prospers, who suffers, who migrates, and who starves. The consellation
of forces that link the Sahel's rural people to global climatic changes, financial
flows, and circuits of political and military power, cannot be adequately
understood if we see the region as suffering a continuing "environmental
emergency". Persistent drought is but one of a set of overwhelming
problems affecting the Sahel,
which has some of the poorest nations in the world. In most countries there is
little internal capacity to cope even with the most pressing impacts of the
drought, let alone the more subtle ones. Boosting this capacity is an important
element of the work of organisations like the
International Institute for Environment and Development's Drylands
Programme, the Club du Sahel, Denmark's
DANIDA, and the Institut
du Sahel in Mali.
Geographers are well placed to undertand the
nature of these changes, and to help shape them. To focus on just three areas
in which a radical, and yet applied geographical input is needed:
we can conduct practical research to permit local
people to take over the management of running of their own development
initiatives, building upon their own skills, indigenous knowledge, and
resources.
we can assess long-term trends, using combinations of
long-range monitoring and detailed local investigations. Detailed local studies
have already identified the evolution of the food crises of the 1970s. Now, as
the world has changed, much of our efforts could be taken up with indicating
the exit points from those same crises.
we should also look to work with those in positions of
influence and power to improve their interventions and to help ensure
positive benefits to rural people and their livelihood systems. It is important
that the skills and aspirations of rural dwellers, and the increasing urban
population, are translated into a language understood by governments and
development projects. Development rarely succeeds where it is imposed or where
it ignores complex social and ecological realities. The last thing the people
of the Sahel need is
poorly thought-out development.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Grateful thanks to Robert W. Kates and Andrew Warren
for comments. The article draws on material from the Club du
Sahel, and the Famine Early Warning Systems Project.
Dr Simon Batterbury lectures
in environmental studies, geography and development studies at the University of Melbourne, Australia. He works in Burkina
Faso and Niger
on case studies of soil and water conservation programmes
and long-term adjustments to social and environmental change. Recent research
is on environmental policy and the francophone Pacific. simonpjb@unimelb.edu.au
On Wednesday May 13th 1998 in London, the
RGS-IBG hosted an open conference for students, policymakers, and researchers
to assess the progress of research and policy in the Sahel region since the droughts of the 1970s,
leading to a re-assessment of future priorities. The international panel of
speakers included Camila Toulmin,
Gaoussou Traoré, Mike Hulme, Claude Raynaut, Rob Groot, Mike Mortimore, Brigitte Thèbaud and Jean-Marie Cour. See
the conference website
and the list of published papers:-
The conference papers are published in an issue of Global
Environmental Change (2001) v11, no 1, 1-95.
|
Title
|
Authors
|
Pages
|
|
The African Sahel 25 years after the great drought: assessing
progress and
moving towards new agendas and approaches
|
Simon Batterbury,
Andrew Warren
|
1 -- 8
|
|
Societies and nature in the Sahel: ecological diversity
and social dynamics
|
Claude Raynaut
|
9 -- 18
|
|
Climatic perspectives on Sahelian desiccation: 1973-1998
|
Mike Hulme
|
19 -- 29
|
|
The Sahel
in West Africa: countries in transition to a
full market economy
|
Jean Marie Cour
|
31 -- 47
|
|
Farmer adaptation, change
and `crisis' in the Sahel
|
Michael J. Mortimore, William M. Adams
|
49 -- 57
|
|
Resource limitations in Sahelian agriculture
|
Henk Breman, J.J.Rob Groot, Herman van Keulen
|
59 -- 68
|
|
Sahel
pastoralists: opportunism, struggle, conflict and negotiation. A case study
from eastern Niger
|
Brigitte Thébaud,
Simon Batterbury
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69 -- 78
|
|
Soil erosion in the
West African Sahel: a review and an application of
a "local political ecology" approach in South West Niger
|
Andrew Warren, Simon Batterbury, Henny Osbahr
|
79 -- 95
|