Transformations in
African Agriculture: natural resources, livelihoods and markets
Report on ESRC Research Seminar, 2000-2002
R45126498499
Award holder:
Dr. Simon Batterbury,
Then: DESTIN,
Now: SAGES,
simonpjb@unimelb.edu.au
22/07/2002
archived at www.simonbatterbury.net
Rationale for the seminars
The purpose of these workshops was to bring together
academics, policymakers, and other interested parties to discuss current trends
– and future opportunities – in
A particular aim was to engage the British overseas aid
agency, DfID, in discussions with scholars in
Meetings held (see annexes
for meeting reports and participant lists)
The first workshop entitled ‘Politics
of Land Reform in the ‘New’ South Africa’ was held in June 2000, jointly convened by Simon Batterbury and Gavin
Capps (DESTIN, LSE) and brought together 50 scholars and land activists from
Europe and South Africa, to debate the implications of recent changes in South
Africa’s land reform programme, with an eye to recent events in Zimbabwe. Key
papers were circulated and delivered by Ben Cousins (University of the Western
Cape) and Gavin Williams (Oxford), and other comments were received from the
participants (see comment by Abie Ditlhake in the annex). Co-funding of £500 was applied for and received from
STICERD, LSE to assist with travel costs from
The second was held on
The third
workshop, ‘Access to Resources: Land Tenure and Governance in Africa’ was led by
Phil Woodhouse of the Institute for Development Policy & Management,
The fourth workshop was held at the University of Lund, Sweden and
pursued an ecological theme. It was entitled the ‘The recovery of vegetation in the
A
fifth meeting, for which funds were not claimed on this grant, again because of
the late date, returned to the ‘governance’ theme. ‘Changing scales of governance and their local impacts – tracing the
links’ was held as a special session of the Association of American
Geographers meetings in
A website was set up in 2000 to hold the main findings
of the workshops, at www.lse.ac.uk/depts/destin/simon/transformations.htm. (now closed)
Constraints
Despite cost-sharing and a small amount of co-funding, funds from this
grant could only stretch to fully funding four workshops. As per the grant proposal,
the entire budget was spent on organizational costs, travel, and accommodation.
The first three seminars in particular were large, ambitious, and costly.
The participation of DFID,
In August 2001 the organiser and grant holder, Simon Batterbury,
completed a two year lectureship at the LSE. He retains part-time and paid work
at the LSE, and was made visiting research fellow until 2004 by the LSE
Director, Anthony Giddens. However he now spends most of the academic year at
the
1. How have
changes in the recent political economy of sub-Saharan
2. What lessons
can be learned about the exploitation of high value-added crops in ways that
benefit producers, not just intermediaries and retailers in the distribution
chain? What difference, therefore, can producer co-operatives and fair-trade
organisations make?
3. How do these
alternative organisations work, and how may they best be supported?
This seminar would have extended the claim by Woodhouse,
Bernstein et al on the universality
of commoditisation processes, but would have examined the extent to which the
alternative agricultural sector offers possibilities to instigate different,
more advantageous labour and capital relations.
Conclusion
Deliberative,
multi-disciplinary and focussed seminars that involve policymakers and
researchers, can help provide clearer messages to take forward into future
research and policymaking. Funding for this series of workshops successfully raised awareness of
several key issues facing African agriculture.
ANNEX:
WORKSHOP REPORTS
|
‘Politics of Land Reform in the ‘New’ held at the London School of
Economics (LSE) on Organised by Gavin Capps and Simon Batterbury |
This workshop was hosted by the Development Studies Institute, funded by the UK Economic and Social Research Council, as a discrete session within a broader seminar series on ‘Transformations in African Agriculture: Natural Resources, Livelihoods and Markets’. Its purpose was to explore the wider (national and regional) politics behind recent shifts in land reform policy in South Africa and to provide a forum for land analysts and activists, with South and Southern African connections, to make sense of, and respond to, those changes.
A full outline of the background, aims and objectives and structure of the workshop has been included below, along with discussion notes, a workshop report, and an independent view of the issues.
Participants
Ainslie, Andrew Range and Forage Institute, Agricultural Research
Council andrewainslie@hotmail.com;
Simon Batterbury, LSE,
Prof. William Beinart, University of Oxford, william.beinart@st-antonys.oxford.ac.uk;
Teddy Brett, LSE, e.a.brett@lse.ac.uk;
Gavin Capps, , LSE, g.j.capps@lse.ac.uk;
Prof. Lionel Cliffe, Leeds University, pol6lrc@lucs-01.novell.leeds.ac.uk,
Prof. Ben Cousins, Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, UWC, bcousins@uwc.ac.uk,
Abie Ditlhake, South African National NGO Coalition abie@sangoco.org.za;
Prof. Ben Fine, SOAS, bf@soas.ac.uk;
Liz Francis, LSE, e.m.francis@lse.ac.uk;
Ruth Hall, Centre for Rural Legal Studies (Stellenbosch), ruth@crls.org.za;
Zakes Hlatshwayo, National Land Committee (Braamfontein) zakes@nlc.co.za;
Susie Jacobs, Manchester Metropolitan University, s.jacobs@mmu.ac.uk;
Deborah James, , LSE, d.a.james@lse.ac.uk ;
Gareth Jones, LSE, g.a.jones@lse.ac.uk ;
Wayne Jordaan, Transvaal Rural Action Committee and NLC, trac@wn.apc.org ;
Moses Jumo, Environment and Development Agency edahrdp@wn.apc.org;
Rosalie Kingwill, Border Rural Committee (Eastern Cape) rak@intekom.co.za ;
Najma Mohamed, Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, UWC, nmohamed@uwc.ac.za;
Prof. Colin Murray, Manchester University, msrsscm@fs1.ec.man.ac.uk;
Debbie Newton, Former Free State DLA, newtondebbie@hotmail.com;
Robert van Niekerk, Oxford University, robert.vanniekerk@applied-social-studies-oxford.ac.uk;
Lungisile Ntsebeza, Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, UWC, lungisile.ntsebeza@st-antonys.oxford.ac.uk;
Zolile Ntshona, Programme for Land and Agrarian Studies, UWC, zntshona@iafrica.com;
Prof. Bridget O’Laughlin, Institute of Social Studies, olaughli@iss.nl;
Palmer, Robin, Oxfam, rpalmer@oxfam.org;
Potts, Debbie, SOAS, dp6@soas.ac.uk;
James Putzel, LSE, j.putzel@lse.ac.uk;
Ian Scoones, IDS, i.scoones@ids.ac.uk;
Dan Taylor, Find Your Feet, London /UCL, fyf@gn.apc.org;
Gavin Williams, University of
Oxford gavin.williams@st-peters.oxford.ac.uk;
Prof. Ben Wisner, Oberlin College, USA bwisner@igc.org;
Phil Woodhouse, Manchester University mzdpjw@mail1.mcc.ac.uk;
Rachel Wrangham, r.p.wrangham@lse.ac.uk;
Ingrid Yngstrom, Oxford University, ingrid.yngstrom@lineone.net
|
Three documents follow below: 1) Discussion notes prepared
by Gavin Capps, 2) Workshop report, prepared by Simon Batterbury, July 2000. 3) Remarks by Abie Ditlhake, Director of the South African Non Governmental Organisation Coalition (SANGOCO) |
1) Outline of Workshop and Discussion Notes
Gavin Capps
Background
The election of
The track record of
This shift in land policy occurred in the
context of the state’s increasingly conservative macroeconomic policy stance,
the apparent downplaying of its social welfare goals, and the alleged
centralisation of political power around its ruling elite. Fundamental and
difficult questions are were posed in 2000 about the future direction of land
policy formation in
Aims
The workshop aimed to generate debate over
the extent and significance of recent changes in South African land reform
policy, with particular reference to the wider politics of land policy
formation in
grasp the political determinants of recent changes in South African land policy, through an analysis of the diverse coalitions who opposed previous policy directions - inside and outside of government - which necessarily raises questions about the character and balance of power in the new dispensation, and of the nature of the ‘transition’ itself
enable activists, advisors and analysts involved in land reform policy in South Africa (previously and currently) to take stock of these changes, share their experiences and discuss possible responses to the new policy environment;
bring in comparative perspectives from the Southern African region and more widely, which are relevant to these aims and objectives.
Discussion Notes
This short set of notes suggests a range of
issues for consideration at the workshop and signals some of the connections
between them. It does not aim to be a complete statement of the current
condition of land reform in
In the context of the problems currently facing land reform in South Africa, and the changes seemingly underway in the policy arena, it seems that there are at least four sets of inter-related issues that we need to consider, each of which relates to different ways of thinking about ‘development policy’ itself. These are:
1. The ‘technical’ issue of institutional
capacity and inertia. A whole series
of commissioned studies and reports have pointed to the fact that
2. The ‘policy as process’ issue of technocratic, top-down policy making coming up against messy and contradictory social realities. Much policy planning is compromised by, on the one hand, political pressures for quick, quantifiable results; and, on the other, social forces and processes which resist, subvert or even co-opt poorly conceived and under-resourced interventions for their own ends. This is as true of black ‘commercial farmers’ being best placed to take the lion’s share of new rural development packages, as it is of ‘traditional authorities’ who have been able to strengthen their local powers through the tenure reform process, or of white farmers reaping new subsidies to labour via housing grants, etc. There is also limited emphasis on building the rural political organisation and capacity to ensure that new legislative rights ‘are made real’ in practice. Policy itself is thus often undermined by the very terms on which it is understood and conducted.
3. The issue of ‘wider politics’, which both links and goes beyond points 1 and 2, by connecting shifts in land policy to broader changes in the balance of power within the state and in the South African political economy as a whole. This issue has four related elements. First, there is the distinct rightward shift within the ANC leadership, that has accelerated throughout the process of the ‘transition’ and culminated in a deeply conservative macro-economic policy stance. The result is a closing down of the spaces that were opened up by the varied social movements that propelled the ANC to power, as the pro-market position is replicated in all policy areas, including land reform. The powerful influence of the World Bank over South African land reform policy has been notable from the onset and the recent, senior personnel changes at the DLA may well reflect a hardening of this trend.
Second, there is the related issue of the varied points of resistance to redistributionist and pro-poor land reform policy. These emanate both from sections of the state and various blocs of economic and political power, such as white farmers, ‘traditional leaders’ and the huge industrial concerns that are linked to, and interested in, maintaining existing patterns of agri-business under conditions of ‘liberalisation’. Coalitions between these interest groups, whether ad hoc or organised, not only shape the outcomes of land reform policy on the ground, but also decisively influence the state, thus setting the parameters within which land policy is formulated and conducted. It would appear that the influence of these lobbies over the current government has become stronger (or at least more open) in recent years, casting doubts on whether the ‘political will’ exists to meaningfully transform the existing pattern of agrarian relations.
Third, there is the question of popular support for land reform and its expression in social movements, which have the potential to pressure the state for change and to ensure that new opportunities from above are realised and defended from below. It is notable that there has been a tailing off of ‘civil society’ activism in rural and urban areas since 1994, although an alliance of land based NGOs has been seeking to counter this trend by organizing rural people and their demands through the Rural Development Initiative. What impact this type of ‘rural centred’ mobilisation, as well as other forms of action, such as land occupations, can have on policy formation is posed all the more sharply by unfolding events in Zimbabwe, which are themselves, of course, much bigger than the land question alone.
Finally, there is the difficult question of
the ways in which ‘race’ has become central to the politics of policy making in
4. The issue of the role of ‘progressive’ land policy advisors and activists. With the official narrowing of the ‘desirable’ and the ‘possible’ in land policy, difficult decisions are now being confronted by policy advisors and activists who previously sought to be involved in, or influence, the land reform programme. In many ways, the current marginalisation of such people by the DLA reflects the experience of the ‘progressive economists’, whose work was increasingly side-lined in favour of neo-liberal orthodoxy as the ANC came closer to power. Thus, as with the ‘progressive economists’, academics and activists concerned with South Africa’s intractably complex land question may have to think more strategically about their relationship to the state and to social movements outside of it, both of which seems to be offering fewer opportunities for promoting radical change at present. The question of ‘which way forward’ is thus a pertinent one that can only be answered effectively with a shared and objective assessment of the changing terrain on which it is being posed.
(These
were discussion notes were prepared by Gavin Capps,
2)
The Politics of Land Reform in the "New"
Report
of a workshop, LSE,
Simon Batterbury, DESTIN, LSE.
[Speaker's initials given in text - they refer to list above]
Post-apartheid
1) restitution of land to
people dispossessed by apartheid,
2) land tenure reform, and
3) land redistribution to the poor
Yet the path to land reform
(*) has been far from smooth; the process of restitution has proceeded too
slowly; land reform has recently seen significant and disturbing changes of
emphasis; and redistribution is mired in controversy. Arguably a policy vacuum
now exists in the light of new legislation announced by the new Minister in
February 2000. A meeting held in
Gavin Williams (paper available from author above) outlined the complex institutional changes that have occurred since the ANC came to power in 1994. He contrasted the relative speed at which the NDA (National Department of Agriculture) has gone about liberalizing agricultural markets since 1994 (through subsidies terminated in the late 1980s, the end of government agriculture boards, and leaving commercial farmers to float in marketplace), with the substantial delays and derailments that have affected the DLA (Department for Land Affairs) responsible for land reform and redistribution. The adoption of a neoliberal macro-economic policy, GEAR (Growth Employment and Distribution) by the ANC soon placed the focus on RSA’s agricultural sector on market led growth rather than redistribution to dispossessed farmers. This trend has been cemented with the merger of the DLA and NDS in 1996 and, importantly, the replacement of Derek Hanekom by Thoko Didiza as Minister for Agriculture in 2000. Didiza’s statements since taking office indicate a strong concern to push commercial agriculture, and the needs of the emergent black commercial farmers, over the calls for land rights for the rural poor. A draft Land Rights Bill has been suspended pending revisions, and this move has been greeted with resignation by its authors and supporters, but with seeming indifference by the DLA management. Williams argued that one vision of modernity in the whole 'actor network’ of land reform players was rapidly replacing another, with market liberalization and privatization currently much higher on the agenda than the former egalitarian commitments to redistributing resources.
Several new initiatives for land reform and the restitution of land to black farmers date from the early 1990s, but by the mid 1990s the World Bank’s proposals to promote commercial agriculture had watered down the welfare objective of land reform as supported by progressive NGOs like the NLC (National Land Commission). The ANC's Reconstruction and Development Plan called for the transfer of 30% of the medium to high-quality white-owned farms to 600,000 people, but this proved an unrealistic hope, and the policy was soon abandoned. The DLA programme attempted to implement redistribution to the poor, by means of Settlement /Land Acquisition Grants of R15000 (£1500) for those falling under an earnings ceiling. Land Reform Pilot Projects went ahead in the 9 provinces since 1994, employing a variety of mechanisms, each with different implementation procedures and personnel. In terms of Land Tenure reform, a major thrust has been to recognize de-facto rights to land, through the formation of Community Trusts and Communal Property Associations. These have been open to abuse by traditional authorities and entrepreneurs, however.
By the early 1999 some 35,000 households had acquired rural land in the former white areas by means of government subsidies. The government has introduced tenure reform primarily on privately held land. Land tenure reform in the communal areas of RSA has lagged behind, partly because of poor administrative capacities and legal/operational confusions. Grants offered are too small for new farmers to make a livelihood in the absence of other income generating opportunities. There is currently (late 2000) a review of the DLA ongoing that recommends a supply-side approach to land allocation, falling back on local authorities to manage the process. This official review would like to see more overall support to medium and some black commercial farmers. Alongside this, grants and payments to new land holders have been restructured. It is envisaged that groups or tribes will now purchase land, using the grant system, and then subdividing blocks for sale to families. Farmers with demonstrable commercial experience will get more assistance, up to R100,000 (£10,000). Williams concluded that these new measures are actually old ones, replicating methods that have tried and failed elsewhere to distinguish between larger commercial and smaller scale, less commercial black farmers.
100 paces back, one step forward?
To some extent the problems and vigorous discussions occurring around property rights and land access in RSA are not unusual; these debates have always preceded major land reforms elsewhere (JP). But with a substantial bureaucracy associated with land issues, some inherited from the apartheid regime, change has been particularly difficult to implement. CM felt that the political regime has actually retreated from aiding the rural poor over the last few decades.
What have been the drivers of change?
1) Williams’ point that the World Bank models have driven the adoption of commercial and market led models of reform, did ring true for some, but it is still the case that as late as the 1980s there was not real discussion of land reform in the Bank, and the models subsequently proposed for RSA by Klaus Deninger, Hans Binswanger and others were at least responsible for a change in policy and the recognition that reforms could usher in greater commercial success in some sectors, by supporting both black and white commercial farmers. The problem again was that the rural poor were marginalised in the mid 1990s WB model and the budget to support them remains small (CM).
2) Several felt that GEAR is the real driver of past and present change in land policy (AD). But 2 caveats; the political left in RSA has yet to develop a really workable set of alternatives that will ensure a modicum of commercial growth coupled to equitable land transfers and reform (GW). Here, BC reminded the meeting of the need to construct such alternatives, actively, possibly through a 'rights-based’ approach to land ownership (**). Secondly as BF pointed out, there is nothing in GEAR as presently formulated, despite its neo-liberal discourse, that would prevent a more progressive land reform happening- macroeconomic policy cannot be blamed in this instance. Indeed the MERG (Macro Economic Research Group) document prepared in 1993 was trying to bolster the 'institutional capacity to deliver’ land reform under the present economic structure, and this could have held out real ways forward (until it was rejected). But AD felt presently, it is unlikely that the economic growth that GEAR promises will support the entire financial burden of wholesale land reform including restitution on white farms and widespread distribution for farming and housing. GC added that under GEAR, the urban labor force is largely demobilized as capital has shifted - leading to further pressures for rural land access.
3) Rather we need to see
that a particular coalition of forces was responsible for the changes witnessed
in land policy after 1994, with 'popular participation’ in decision making now
slimmed back considerably and present directives and decision making at the
national level being, unfortunately, mired in secrecy. Partly this has been
driven by the fear that 'land reform may spiral out of control’ (BF), although
4) Thus land reform, perhaps challenging Gavin William’s analysis further, does not follow entirely its own policy discourse but is imbricated with state, financial, and regional concerns (of which the most important at present is land seizures on white farms in Zimbabwe). The key question to understand is "Who is pressing for land reform?". If this is asked and understood first, effective responses can be targeted better, and alternative policies then formulated. In the discussion of how to respond to the recent disappointing announcements that land will be vested in 'tribal authorities’ rather than restituted to communities or individual black smallholders for houses/farms, we must recognize the vital importance of local or provincial level organs of the DLA and other non governmental groups, who are on the ground trying to implement policies in a situation of uncertainty and fast-changing legislation. Reform and greater capacity is needed at this level too, under the onslaught of claims for land in order to mine the minerals underneath it, and so-on (Bo’L). And de-facto policy is made and interpreted at this level.
5) Institutional capacity and performance will always be a limiting factor in promoting land reform in RSA. We should see that there are significant institutional continuities with the past (AD). We should not see the present policy as any sort of break from the past; neither the present, nor the latter-day apartheid policy really seriously envisaged a radical redistribution of land to the majority of the population. Presently impediments - financial and bureaucratic - disable any widespread land reform. This view was echoed by BO’L, who questioned whether conflicts of personality that have clearly driven some of the recent national level maneuvers and changes really constitute 'policy breaks’ or disjunctures and whether they should be analyzed as 'command driven’ at all. Rather, as AD noted, we see policies as shaped by politics in which opposition politics - not just the politics of those in power (who BC labelled as a black middle class and a bourgeoisie group) - has had an influence. Personality clashes are only one visible facet of power dynamics, but may not be directly related to them.
6) DN, who has experienced
local level implementation of DLA policy in the Eastern Cape, echoed AD in
suggesting local government in RSA lacks the capacity, the infrastructure and
the expertise to implement a complex set of land measures; to deal with claims,
to adjudicate, and to orchestrate land transfers when agreed. She went as far
as to say that in her experience, local government is 'non viable’ at present,
dominated by a class of insecure politicians trying to assist poorly trained
potential farmers (some of whom want land primarily for housing, rather than
agricultural production). BC echoed this - he noted that under the present
regime, almost no land transfers had actually occurred in
7) Our conclusion from this first session was that we may need to look to civil society in its multiple forms to provide a credible set of goals and policies to occupy the policy vacuum and to press for sustained land reform in the absence of strong central direction from the government at the present time. In so doing, NGOs and other actors needed to exploit opportunities in the media (since denationalization of broadcasting?) to promote equitable and rights based approach to land reform (ZH).
Elements of this agenda:-
- rural people need other things than land per se. [see also seminar three in this series]. They need the components of livelihoods - jobs, finance, infrastructure, housing, and healthcare (DN). Land reform or even the DLA, will not provide all of this.
The chieftaincy should not be allowed to dominate the present land reform system. Need organized campaigns and new coalitions to fight the 'restitution to tribal authorities’ policy, if this leads to elite capture of the benefits of land restitution and redistribution.
Selling off land in former
land reform needs to be swiftly enacted with less prevarication and changes of direction (JP). A lesson from other counties is that slow land reform is always ineffective.
given its enormous financial cost,
we need to think of land reform as having goals that lie partially outside
the market (BW). Common property resource management regimes provide people
with security and resilience to environmental or political-economic shocks, and
these cannot be equated with opportunities for substantial financial gain.
There is a disjuncture with rest of
devolution of powers over land ‘all the way downwards’ is not necessarily a great thing in RSA since local level capacity does not yet exist to manage it adequately. [see also seminar three in this series].
Politics of land reform
Ben Cousins (University of
the
Political interests in the state include The Presidency and Cabinet, Government Departments; old white bureaucrats and new black bureaucrats; provincial government and local government bodies. In society at large, there are differentiated rural communities, constituencies of farm workers who often live on private farms, a set of emerging black entrepreneurs, white commercial farmers, traditional leaders, and a variety of corporate capitalist interests and foreign investors. There are linkages between many organisations in society at large - eg between the NLC and NAFU.
Actor networks formed since 1990 have included the NLC (National Land Commission), the ANC’s Land Commission (LAPC) which was itself advised by the World Bank, and university economists. The conjunction of these three bodies led to the formulation of the RDP and land reform policy. Implementation initially fell to the Department of Land Affairs (DLA) and Derek Hanekom, but under van Niekerk in the Department of Agriculture, Government policy has essentially fallen into three policy arms
rights based legislation and programmes
Market assisted redistribution via the 16,000 R grants referred to above
deregulation of agriculture and the promotion of small scale farming.
NGO pressure throughout the 1990s has been to resist property clauses in new legislation (thus supporting those without property), to assert 'rights’ based land reform, and to assist in implementation of the new legislation as affiliates of government bodies.
Cousins’ framework for understanding the outcome of three different policy discourses was as follows:
|
Criteria |
Policy Discourses |
||
|
EQUITY |
"State led but community based" - challenge inherited framework of property rights - popular participation - attack gender bias in land allocation |
"Combine state, markets, community and rights" - rights for dispossessed and vulnerable - justice and redress through restitution and redistribution - target 'communities’ and the poor |
"Market-led but state assisted" - deracialise agriculture - remove discriminatory legislation and by affirmative action |
|
EFFICIENCY |
Enhance
value of multiple rural livelihoods through expanded land-base and support |
R16,0000 grant for land aquisition via the market/business plans and CPAs Developmental restitution of land Enhance agricultural production at a variety of scales Create a lean but efficient state (outsourcing) |
Subsidies/grants/support services for emerging black farmers. Promote efficient operation of markets through deregulation. Attract foreign investment. Target rural development in high-potential zones (SDI’s) |
|
IDENTITY |
Land - ----- tradition ---- African leadership |
||
Policy shifts in 1999-2000 have resulted in some elements of this wider South African discourse proving more powerful than others.
In 1999 and 2000, the terms of debate and the direction of policy have shifted markedly, with new directives and personnel.
· From the NGO side, there has been criticism that the projected restitution of land has been too slow, that redistribution has been badly planned, that there is a lack of political will behind these measures, and that there is a gender bias against women in the way land reform has been handled.
· From both internal critics in the DLA and in the Department of Agriculture, came the criticism that the DLA leadership was too ‘white’ and potentially racist. Groups like CONTRALESA, SSAV/Agrisa, and some Provincial politicians were partially responsible for making the call that emerging commercial farmers have been neglected, traditional leaders undermined, and implementation of reform was too centralised.
It was the combination of these two critical thrusts that swept Didiza into office in 1999. Her response has been to
Design a ‘black commercial farmers programme’
To declare an intention to ‘transfer lands to tribes’, where customary law will apply
To go about restitution using cash payouts
to support black leadership in government Departments
to initiate, in Sept 2000, an integrated rural development programme, possibly with links to the FAO, and with unknown operational components.
Given the critiques
launched against the DLA in 1999, one can begin to see how these policies have
found favour in some quarters (not with the majority at the workshop, largely
because of the potential loss of the redistribution agenda for the millions
living in former
What to do?
The meeting unified people who feel that the process of policy change on land reform in South Africa has been ineffective, and that ‘just’ and ‘morally right’ redistribution of land has effectively been sidelined because it is perceived as too controversial and difficult. We did not successfully identify where organised political pressure for change on land reform could come from, and how linkages/coalitions could be forged. We also were a little unclear about the role of academics in this process. Is their role to come up with better ‘plans’ for the state to imlement, or should we be skeptical about the state’s desire to listen to such ideas in the absence of any real political pressure from below to back them up?
The way forward, we believe, lies in
Facilitating the self-organizing capacities of rural interests – to improve their ability to lobby and to stake claims that are more powerful than those that are currently circulating. This may best be achieved by pilot projects…
Wider alliances must be forged, for example with trade unions and sympathetic state officials, to re-consider the current tenure reform.
for Liz Francis, we need to develop an alternative ‘discourse’ – but also to understand budgetary constraints and the management of money, therefore remaining realist.
pushing a livelihoods approach, that reminds the powers that be that land is just one component in complex and overlapping livelihood systems, and it is therefore hard to expect a) all farmers to become commercially successful, or 2) that land will always be cared for and productive. Land is used to support livelihoods; not to support established commercial interests.
understand and support the work of farm workers.
RH identified that PLASS and NLC has already initiated a campaign voicing concern about present policies. There will be written submission to government on these issues, plus an open letter to all Ministers. Alliances are being forged, for example with SANGOCO (South African Non Governmental Organisation Coalition). A policy summit on these critical concerns will appear at the end of 2000.
Postscript, 2002.
Since the workshop was
held, there has been increasing pressure on the ANC from organisations like the
NLC, to move from ‘willing buyer, willing seller’ and to exercise its
‘expropriation clause’ in order to speed up land redistribution on white-owned
farms, particularly following the Zimbabwe land crisis. See The Namibian, July
5, 2000 : Business Day, 3 Aug 2000 ‘Land Reform in Trouble’, 'ANC explores Land
Expropriation’ (Business Day, 15th July 2000). In March 2001, the
National Land Committee attacked Land and Agriculture Minister Thoko
Didiza's about-turn on the first major case - the expropriation of a
white-owned farm near
See also Zimmerman FJ.
2000. Barriers to Participation of the Poor in
Footnotes
*What is land tenure reform?
"Land tenure may be defined as the
terms and conditions on which land is held, used and transacted. Land tenure
reform refers to a planned change in the terms and conditions (e.g. the
adjustment of the terms of contracts between land owners and tenants, or the
conversion of more informal tenancy into formal property rights). A fundamental
goal is to enhance and to secure people’s land rights. This may be necessary to
avoid arbitrary evictions and landlessness; it may also be essential if rights
holders are to invest in the land and to use it sustainably. In
**Rights based approach includes
"..rights to occupy a homestead, to use land for annual and perennial
crops, to make permanent improvements, to bury the dead, and to have access for
gathering fuel, poles, wild fruit, thatching grass, minerals, etc.; rights to
transact, give, mortgage, lease, rent and bequeath areas of exclusive use;
rights to exclude others from the above-listed rights, at community and/or
individual levels; and linked to the above, rights to enforcement of legal and
administrative provisions in order to protect the rights holder." Martin Adams, Sipho Sibanda and
Stephen Turner (1999) Land Tenure Reform and Rural Livelihoods in
3) Remarks prepared for the meeting.
Abie Ditlhake abie@sangoco.org.za
Director of the South African Non Governmental Organisation Coalition (SANGOCO)
May, 2000
Before analysing the political determinants
of recent developments in land reform in
It is thus important to acknowledge that some principles underlying the land reform proposals regarding the following are positive and must be supported:
adoption of a livelihoods approach to development;
having a gradation between subsistence and commercial farmers with a range of products to cater for each;
allowing access to more than one land grant over time;
delinking the food safety net grant from the housing grant, allowing households to access both;
providing some land to a wide range of people in rural areas;
the suggested land use grant as a production support grant for people having acquired land through the food safety net programme.
Macro-economy
The problem is that the macro-economic framework within which these proposals are made will mean a very limited intervention in reality. This conclusion is supported by the following analysis:
- First, if the entire budget for land reform is well below R1 billion a year (as it is currently, perhaps permanently), only limited/insignificant inroads can be made into a demographically proportionate transfer of land to Africans, whether commercially oriented farmers or the landless and unemployed. Hence the limited objective of 30% transfer of farmland in 20 years. These limited goals are already based on the assumption of a sharp increase in the government's budget allocation to land redistribution (R4.7 bn for this programme alone over the next five years). This possibility is clearly unrealistic/rhetorical as it contradicts the government’s stated policy as underpinned by GEAR. Even if the land reform budget is increased as hoped for in the proposals, and if the programme is maintained for the full term and is 100% successful, it is not enough to shift the balance of power in rural areas. The budget for integrated land reform must be increased massively. And this implies fundamental rethinking of the inbult constraints of the macro-economic policy framework. Something unthinkable given the resolve of Minister T. Manuel and President Thabo Mbeki to see through its implementation to `attract’ direct foreign investment.
- Second, without tackling the issue of
market-driven (or "assisted" - and this merely means
market-driven but with the state paying for some of the transactions) land
reform, too much money goes into paying for the repurchase of natural
resources which are the birthright of all people, with subsequently less
money available for developing the necessary social and economic
infrastructure required to use the land productively and sustainably. The
Food Safety Net programme suggests that households use no less than 70% of
the grant on buying the land. This is a waste of resources. A programme of
orderly expropriation should be considered, whereby organised rural people
identify land they want to use, and the state facilitates negotiations
with the land owner for the transfer of the land, or a portion of it. The
basic principle would be to say that not all land owned by an individual
could be taken from them, and that once they have transferred some of the
land under their ownership, claims cannot be made on the remaining land by
others. Deeds to the land so exchanged should be given to all concerned.
This has begun in
Race and class
The food safety net programme represents a
significant aspect of the integrated proposals. One million rural households
are targeted to receive almost 19 million hectares of land over 20 years, with
more than 75% of the overall programme budget being used to achieve this.
However, there doesn't appear to be a vision of a fundamentally transformed
structure of rural social relations at the end of the 20 years. The poor may be
slightly better off, but will still be deeply mired in poverty. A quote from a
Richard Levin article in the mid-1990s (talking about BATAT, but equally
relevant to the "new" proposals) says: "This programme runs the
risk of 'adding on' petty capitalist black farmers to a largely intact core of
white farmers with a monopoly control of agricultural productive and marketing
activities. While black farming in all its forms must be supported, there needs
to be an alternative capable of eroding the monopoly power which white farmers
exert over agriculture." In the proposals, the need to de-racialise
agriculture is raised as a reason for state support to black commercial
farmers. The question needs to be posed, however, as to the value of a
de-racialised agriculture which neither fundamentally alters the class balance
of forces in rural areas nor transforms structures which centralise power and
control in the hands of those who have resources. Structural change is required
in
Integration
Without integrating land reform with the provision of an adequate water supply, access to cheap inputs or with the development of necessary infrastructure to store and distribute surpluses, even commercial farming is likely to be a failure. Integration of land, water and agricultural interventions is required (DLA/DWAF/NDA). In turn, these need to be linked to programmes that allow for the generation of local economies by supporting the local production of inputs for agriculture and non-farm economic activities, and local distribution and retailing networks (DTI). There should be a concerted effort to develop an understanding and practice of local production for local markets. The IDPs should be built into the centre of development efforts, and popular participation in these plans (with consequent accountability) must be strengthened.
Rural development is a product of access to natural resources (land, water and vegetation) plus the availability of economic infrastructure (production, communication, storage and distribution) plus the deployment of Rural Development Officers (trained in participatory, human-centred and integrated approaches to sustainable development) to stimulate and support the development efforts of the people themselves. (In short, raw materials plus technology plus skills). Currently, access to natural resources is severely restricted for the majority of the African rural population, and is likely to be only slightly less so in the forseeable future given the proposed policy framework. Even where it exists, economic infrastructure in rural areas is decaying. Where new infrastructure is being put in, it is often inappropriate and inserted on the basis of narrow economic cost-recovery principles on a community-by-community basis. Instead of training and deploying a cadre of rural development officers armed with an integrated and participatory approach to development, the only technical support provided to rural people is a collapsing agricultural extension service based on apartheid models of development.
The foregoing analysis indicate that, even if taken in good faith, the `new’ shift in land reform policy , like its `predecesor’, is doomed to fail. This is surprising given the fact that it emerged after an assessment of the failures of the previous approach. Having `correctly ‘ noted some of the reasons for its failure, it went on to address different issues. The question is why?
Political determinants of the `new’ shifts
Key political observations are discernible in answering the above question;
Land reform policy in
What has happened, instead, is the refining and sharpening of this confusing contradiction. What the ‘new’ shift signify in reality, is the erasing of the pro-poor rhetoric from the government discourse. This rhetoric - poor of the poor - is seen as sending wrong signnal to the potential investors. Therefore, why not use the language that correctly captures the political intention of the Mbeki administration. Here the correct language is that GEAR is here to stay, and has to be consolidated in every important respects, and it should leave no doubt. Coupled with this shift, is the consolidation of the state apparutus to face up to the potential reaction from the public. Consolidating and expanding the office of the President is the most important move in this regard. A sort of imperial presidency, slowly it removes power and initiative from from the parliament, cabinet, ministers and the departments. All policies have to be screened by this empowered office before going to parliament. The objective is to ensure that all policies and acts are GEAR compliant. Both Labour Tenant’s and Extention of the Security of Tenure Act (ESTA), if were to be re-initiated in their current form, would not pass this imperial dragnet.
Therefore, what is happening is what was initially intended, but due to uncertain configuration of social relations of power in the immediate post apartheid period, it was moral to use a language that reseble pro-poor policies, while in fact is not, hence the confusion and erroneous analysis. Because of the unsustainability of the language rhetoric due to `potential’ foreign direct investors, and white farmers, a need has arisen to remove the gloves. In doing this, some obtacles needed to be neutralised. These included, among other things;
- Policy and political clarity: This explains the emergence of the ‘new’ policy, and the political language accompanying it.
- Unambiguous loyalty to articulate the `new’ discourse: This explains the confusion and restructring in the DLA, and relats change of staff. This does not mean that those affected are necessarily progressive and pro-poor, but that they cannot be trusted, due to their historical association. It should be noted here that most of them are infect responsible for confusion as to the progressive character of the immediate post-1994 land reform policy. In fact, they have always maintained that the policy framework is correct, the problem is lack of capacity.
- Political justification and consolation: Three
issues are discernible here (I) Balance of forces: that the balance
of social forces are such that no significant resistance will emerge.
There exist no serious organisation or movement of rural people to mount
any significant opposition. That the NGOs articulating their interest are
not a political force to reckon with. (2) Historical relations to land:
That rural people in
Conclusion
Therefore, the implications of either new or
old policy framework are almost the same, albeit varying in degrees and pace.
What separates them, in practical terms, is a question of language emphasis,
motivated by the analysis of the configuration of the social relation of class
forces. They are both influenced by perceptions of what the political economy
of globalisation expects of
Drylands Research Working Paper 40
LIVELIHOOD TRANSFORMATION IN SEMI-ARID
Proceedings of a workshop arranged by the ODI with Drylands Research and the ESRC, in the series ‘Transformations in African agriculture’
The Old Theatre,
Drylands Research,
The research reported in this working paper is derived from the two following research projects of the of the United Kingdom Department for International Development: (1) Policy requirements for farmer investment in semi-arid Africa, funded by the Natural Resources Policy Research Programme (NRSP, Project R 7072 CA); and (2) Kano-Maradi study of long-term change, funded by the Committee for Economic and Social Research (ESCOR, Project R7221) and the Leventis Foundation. Go to www.drylandsresearch.org.uk for details of all publications produced by the research team of this project, and how to order them. Abstracts of all Working Papers are available on the web site.
DFID and the Leventis Foundation can accept no responsibility for any information provided or views expressed.
ISsN 1470-9384 © Drylands Research 2000
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publishers.
Preface
Drylands Research Working Papers present, in preliminary form, research results of studies carried out in association with collaborating researchers and institutions.
This working paper is part of a study which aims to relate long-term
environmental change, population growth and technological change, and to
identify the policies and institutions which are conducive to sustainable
development. The study builds upon an earlier project carried out by the
Overseas Development Institute (
) in
|
Kenya
Makueni District |
|
Niger
Maradi Department (in association with ODI) |
Nigeria
Kano Region (in association with ODI) |
For each of these study areas, there is a series of working papers and a
synthesis, reviewed at country workshops. Due to the limited number of working
papers on
An overall synthesis was discussed at an international workshop at
Enquiries can be addressed to:
|
Michael
Mortimore, Mary Tiffen, Drylands Research, Website: www.drylandsresearch.org.uk |
Francis
Gichuki, Abdou Fall, Email: abdoufal@refer.sn, abdoufal@itc.com Yamba Boubacar, J. Ayodele Ariyo, |
CONTENTS
1 Introduction *
2 Presentation of main results *
2.1 Investment
constraints in semi-arid areas *
2.2 Research
goals *
2.3 A
developmental model for livelihoods *
2.4
Population increase and urbanisation *
2.5
Land-based production over time *
2.6
Intensification and soil fertility indicators *
2.7 Access to
land *
2.8 Nature of
the rural family and its financial management *
2.9 Relevance
of education *
2.10 Policy
links: markets *
2.11 Policy
links: non-farm *
2.12 Prices *
2.13 Credit *
2.14
Limitations on governments *
3 Farmer investments: presentation by
country co-ordinators *
4 Plenary discussions *
4.1 The role of
education *
4.2 The model
and diversified incomes *
4.3 Social
institutions *
4.4
Discussions following the country co-ordinators’ presentation *
5 Agenda for working groups *
6 Reports of working groups *
Group 1: Conserving natural resources
and improving their management *
Group 2: Increasing the value of crop,
livestock and other NR-based output *
Group 3: Developing investment
capacity and market access *
Group 4: Enhancing human resources and
the non-farm sector *
7 Concluding plenary and final remarks
by Claude Raynaut *
8 Appendix: Participants *
The workshop was introduced by Simon Maxwell, Director of Overseas
Development Institute (ODI), who referred to the earlier study carried out
under the ODI on the Machakos District, Kenya, 1960-90. The current study is a
follow-up, in which similar methodologies have been used to examine changes in
four different semi-arid areas of Africa –
2 Presentation of main results
Michael Mortimore and Mary Tiffen presented the main findings of the study.
2.1 Investment constraints in semi-arid areas
This research is concerned with semi-arid farming areas in Sub-Saharan Africa, where certain natural constraints act on farmer investments:
Rainfall is low, seasonal (4-6 months per
year), variable and, in the
Bio-productive potential is low, except where
water can be concentrated, naturally or artificially, on small areas.
These characteristics were illustrated by graphs of rainfall in the four study districts, and of rainfed plant biomass production.
The research goals are:
- to obtain a better understanding of the
responses of smallholders in semi-arid environments to environmental,
economic and demographic change over the past 40 years;
- to derive policy lessons for enabling
measures that will enhance their ability to invest and to develop their
natural resources and their livelihoods; and
- to validate the Machakos hypothesis that
there can be positive linkages between population growth and livelihood
intensification.
The research design reflected policy makers’ concern for sustainable natural resource management. Donors and development agencies now recognise a need for diversifying livelihood development beyond natural resources. The research findings show that the two objectives are compatible, and that farmers in semi-arid areas have always had multisectoral livelihood strategies.
A DEVELOPMENTAL MODEL FOR LIVELIHOODS
2.3 A developmental model for livelihoods
The authors’ Machakos model proposed that as land becomes scarce, the options for farmers are:
- migration to a rural area with vacant
land
- urban migration
- intensification of the existing farmed
area.
Currently, within the study districts, the first option no longer exists, though it was still open in Makueni and Maradi until a few years ago.
A new livelihoods development model reflects this reality. Central to it is the household, which combines producers, managers and consumers. Since we are concerned with farmers, it possesses both land and labour. It is subject to environmental and economic pressures (including those derived from policy), which influence its allocations of labour, capital, and other factors among its economic activities. These may be based on natural resources (crop and livestock production, harvesting of wild products, etc.) and/or on labour (diversifying incomes, migration, education, adapting family and other institutions). This ‘twin-track’ framework of decision-making is reflected in the two sides of the model. Knowledge, skills and capital offer a framework of opportunities and constraints. Where activities are managed on a household basis, capital generated by one activity can often be invested in a different one. Thus, the two sides of the model suggest a dynamic balance whose exact specifications result from the circumstances of a particular household.
The model assumes that a rural household (and, of course, an individual within it) has a capacity to make rational decisions to respond to changing opportunities or constraints, including those offered by markets. The research supports this assumption. Hence, policy should enhance people’s ability to take advantage of opportunities, rather than directing or prescribing what they should do with their assets.
2.4 Population increase and urbanisation
Population increase is a common pressure driving change since it alters land/labour relationships. All four areas have experienced rapid population growth in the past 40 years, but whereas in Makueni and Maradi, farmers could still disperse to vacant, though less attractive, land at the beginning of the period, in Diourbel and Kano the frontier had already closed by 1960 (a point called ‘saturation’ in French literature). This led to rapid urbanisation in both places. The importance of urbanisation for rural livelihoods is that there is:
- an increasing market for foods that
semi-arid areas can produce, if currency management and national
subsidy policies allow. In
- an increasing alternative market for
rural labour on either a seasonal or permanent basis.
Non-farm income has always been a component of income in semi-arid areas
owing to the long dry season, but it has increased in importance, and in
2.5 Land-based production over time
This was illustrated by charts showing:
- output value/ sq. km, Machakos, 1957-87;
- groundnut and millet yields/ha, Diourbel
1960-94;
- groundnut and millet yields/mm rain,
Diourbel 1960-94;
- millet and sorghum yields/ha, Maradi,
1979-98;
- output value per capita, Machakos
1957-87;
- groundnut and millet yields/per capita,
Diourbel, 1960-96;
- cereal output per capita, Maradi,
1964-98;
- livestock population, Diourbel, 1960-96;
- livestock population, Maradi, 1988-97.
While the West African statistics do not show increases in value-added per ha comparable to those in Machakos up to 1987, they nevertheless provide grounds for cautious optimism about the capacity to sustain farm production against declining rainfall and soil fertility constraints, in the longer term (eliminating trend distortions of climatic or economic shocks). Notable features are the maintenance of millet yields per unit of rainfall in Senegal (while falling per capita and stagnating per ha), the maintenance of millet output per capita in Maradi, with variable but falling yields, and the rising importance of livestock in Maradi and Diourbel.
2.6 Intensification and soil fertility indicators
A model of the transition from degradation to intensification, as population density increases, was presented. The model suggests that a transition occurs from extensive agriculture, associated with soil degradation under increasing population density, to intensification and recovery of soil fertility as labour and technology are applied to increasing output per ha. The research shows that the four study areas are at different stages in this transition, and that intensification and output are influenced by policy, markets, and rainfall. As population densities increase, there is:
- an advance of cultivation (as a
percentage of area);
- an increase in labour use per ha (most
clearly evident in peak labour use in critical farm operations)
As the labour for intensification might not be available if other work options are preferred, it is important to understand the opportunity costs of farm (and of livestock tending) labour.
Soil fertility indicators have been measured in all four study areas. Rather
than the overall decline predicted by conventional models, the data show a
clear division between sustainable regimes on infields (where integrated or
‘agro-ecological’ practices are applied) and outfields (where the decline of
fallowing and the high cost of inorganic fertilisers have created a crisis).
This was illustrated in reference to Sob village,
Tenure systems are having to adapt increasingly to:
- scarcity of unclaimed resources;
- subdivision of claimed resources;
- consumption needs;
- market participation; and
- monetarisation of the factors of
production.
The responses were characterised by:
- adaptation of custom
- investment;individualisation;
- inequality;
- and competition.
In general, the research suggests that tenure insecurity does not inhibit private investment. This weakens the case for state intervention, which has sometimes been ill-informed and even counter-productive.
2.8 Nature of the rural family and its financial management
The rural family remains a strong social unit, united by ties of affection and duty, but its nature is changing. Family residences can be spatially separate – partly in new farm areas, partly in urban areas. While different family units headed by adult children have independent incomes, there are family financial flows between units, to meet:
- consumption needs, emergency or regular;
- investment needs, farm or non-farm,
including education of young;
- social networking (ceremonies,
festivals, marriage, funerals, religious brotherhoods, etc).
Examples were given for
Parents in Makueni see the education provided by primary schools as essential for communication skills, and relevant to rural life as well as preparation for higher education and jobs. However, some are beginning to doubt the value of Year 8, and the cost-benefit ratio of secondary education. Parents in Diourbel and Maradi, while valuing wisdom for their children, are less likely to see academic education in a French language primary school as relevant, or in accordance with their Islamic social norms.
The studies show farmers’ ability to transform their output in response to market signals, for example:
Policy on infrastructure is important.
Given that in semi-arid areas, rural livelihoods depend on a combination of farm and non-farm incomes, relevant policies embrace those directed towards creating more remunerative non-farm opportunities, for example, the development of rural towns with water and electricity for workshops, and a school curriculum relevant to informal and self-employment.
Governments recognised the importance of prices and reacted by attempting to
control them, in the belief this would enhance stability and improve the
investment climate. Seasonal price fluctuations are well-known to farmers and
traders, and provide incentives for storage. But during the study period,
uncontrolled millet prices were more stable in
What can cause dislocation are sudden changes such as those caused by
devaluation (such as that of the CFA franc in 1994), the abrupt removal of
subsidies (as in
- avoiding over-valuation of the currency,
which leads to food imports as well as eventual devaluation;
- avoiding acute inflation;
- tariffs for food imports and
agricultural inputs;
- credit policies.
Credit is often seen as a remedy to capital scarcity, but, especially in a risky semi-arid environment, it can bankrupt both borrower and lender. Credit policies must consider the following.
- Is it repayable by farmers?
- Is it viable for govrnments?
- Should its role be restricted to
introducing new technologies?
Maradi farmers first bought new farm implements with credit, but have
continued buying them since credit stopped, because the Nigerian food market
was providing a profitable outlet for the extra production they enabled. This
story replicated that of plough-farming in
2.14 Limitations on governments
All four countries now have static or falling GDP per capita, leading to limited taxable capacity. For some, aid per capita has been high in the past, but is now falling rapidly. Hence, all policy recommendations have to take account of limited government resources. This justifies our emphasis on policies to enable private household investments, which have played a greater role in the past than has been acknowledged.
3 Farmer investments: presentation by country co-ordinators
Highlights of the research were presented jointly, with examples from each country.
- Were they timely?
- Are they effective?
- Is policy intervention timely?
- Did policy create an enabling environment?
- What are the implications of untimely
and inefficient investments?
- What is the way forward?
Examples of supportive policies in
(1) c.1950 - mid-1980s:
- Rainfall was variable, but
macro-economic polices were slowly evolving and fairly consistent, providing
a farm investment environment with moderate risks which led to large farm
investments.
- Prices were stable except when there was
civil unrest (1966) or drought (1972-73).
(2) Mid-1980s - 2000:
- Rainfall decreased
- Macro-economic policies changed rapidly
and were sometimes contradictory, particularly in the case of the:
- massive devaluation of the national
currency;
- withdrawal of subsidies on fertilisers,
and other farm inputs
- high fuel prices (which are major costs
for traders)
- trade liberalisation
The investment environment became very risky, marked by hyper-inflation, crippling industry and its demand for agricultural raw materials, leading to:
- competition with imported foods
- sharp decline in consumer purchasing
power and falling effective demand.
Returns on investments were unsustainable and unpredictable. Suggested policy improvements were:
- Price stabilisation, with particular
reference to inputs such as fuel and fertiliser
- Creation of diverse opportunities to
generate incomes through
- improvements in infrastructure;
- development of alternative energy
sources in rural areas;
- improvement of access to education; and
- micro-credit for irrigation.
- reducing groundnut domination in the
cropping system and putting emphasis on food crops (millet, sorghum, cowpeas);
- intensifying animal production;
- developing non-farm enterprise (trade,
artisanal production).
- exporting farm labour to urban areas and
other countries
The question now before
- facing the dilemma of groundnuts,
hitherto regarded as central to both the rural and national economies;
- recognising livestock intensification as
a key element in a sustainable production and income system;
- promoting non-agricultural activities to
alleviate land pressure;
- involving all the stakeholders,
including the Mouride leaders, to debate these issues and the strategies.
(1) 1960-1974: Modernisation of the economy
- Development of a groundnut industry
- Guaranteed producer prices
- Increases in taxes on producers
Tax and price policy were in contradiction.
(2) 1974-1980: Food self sufficiency
Prompted by food deficiency (the Sahel Drought of 1972-74), and the availability of uranium revenue, the Government launched a variety of rural projects, some loan-financed. Credit was made available for new farm equipment.
(3) 1984 - 2000: Structural adjustment
The state had been omnipresent, but now withdrew, leading to the end of
credit and of most projects. While this might be thought unconducive to farm
investment, in fact the capacity to adapt had increased, and farmers have
continued to invest in new crops and equipment despite the withdrawal of
credit. Motivation was provided by the strong influence of
Phil Bradley asked for information on
4.2 The model and diversified incomes
Deryke Belshaw said that the model should show international as well as national economic influences. It should be made dynamic, with the household decisions affecting the technical and institutional via feedback loops. Karim Hussein asked for more disaggregation, the poor and the less poor, who may be differently affected by, for example, devaluation of the Franc de la Communauté Financière Africaine (FCFA), access to education, or credit. He also raised the importance of social networking, especially producer organisations. David Niemeijer said there are pressures and opportunities in the model, but the poorest groups may drop out of sight. Matthew Okai asked for more definitions. Claude Raynaut said the model is too general: there are differences by category and region. He asked what the state can do about the increasing inequality referred to in Murton’s study in Kenya, and suggested that poor people can better make labour than money investments. Joos Koster noted the importance of rural-urban linkages. Andrew Dorward said non-farm diversification is increasing and the poor are dropping out of the natural resource sector. Grace Carswell asked when diversification income is substituting for, and when adding to, natural resource based activity. Camilla Toulmin said the model should show that dryland areas are often affected by non-dryland events. Lucy Ambridge said livelihood analysis is useful in seeing what people have and do not have; the issue is the connection to policy changes.
Mazzucato said that in Burkina Faso, social networks for accessing land and labour affect the ability to intensify, and could benefit the poor. Toulmin emphasised the continued importance of the family.
4.4 Discussions following the country co-ordinators’ presentation
Deryke Belshaw noted that 1979 was a seminal date in
John Pender asked about soil conservation returns to labour. In a staged investment strategy, the first investments are the most profitable. The importance of livestock in livelihoods indicates the importance of giving more attention to grazing land. Matthew Okai noted total factor productivity analysis may not take account of ecological sustainability. Adam Pain commented on the missing meso-link between micro- and macro-priorities. Given the restricted funds, planning is about choosing.
Participants were invited to join one of four groups, as follows:
Group 1: Conserving natural resources and improving their management
Group 2: Increasing the value of crop, livestock and other NR-based outputs
Group 3: Developing investment capacity and market access
Group 4: Enhancing human resources and the non-farm sector
Each group was asked to consider the following key questions:
- Is a view of rural livelihood
transformation as driven by capacities as well as by constraints a
practicable basis for policy formation?
- What areas are critically important in
constructing an enabling policy framework for livelihood development in
the drylands?
- Recognising that politicians are
influenced by interest groups, how can a participatory debate on enabling
policy formation be initiated and sustained at the national level?
Group 1: Conserving natural resources and improving their management
Members
Camilla Toulmin IIED (Chairman/ Rapporteur)
Andrew Warren University College, London,
Geography Bill Adams Downing College, Cambridge, Geography Yamba Boubacar
University of Niamey David Bourn Environmental Research Group, Oxford Phil
Bradley University of Hull, Geography Constance Corbier-Barthaux Agence
Française de Developpement Robin Grimble Consultant, ex Natural Resources
Institute Hassan Hassan World Bank Kathy Homewood University College, London,
Anthropology Adam Manvell University of East Anglia, Development Studies
Michael Mortimore Drylands Research David Niemeijer Wageningen University,
Environmental Systems Analysis Group Matthew Okai Consultant Henry Osbahr
University College, London, Geography John Pender International Food Policy
Research Institute Claude Raynaut University of Bordeaux II Beryl Turner
Consultant Magatte Ba Centre de Suivi Ecologique, Senegal
More comments on the model:
There needs to be more feedback within the system, rather than it being linear in form. Clearly the natural resources available are not just given but are themselves transformed by human and livestock interaction. Thus additional loops are needed. Also it was felt that the options faced by poorer and better-off groups are substantially different, requiring a range or family of models to suit their different circumstances.
A reminder of the key findings from the studies to date:
- Farmers play a very active role in
pursuit of more sustainable farming systems and improved livelihoods. They
are highly competent in assessing the opportunities available and best
able to find answers which are appropriate to their circumstances.
- They are highly responsive to economic
conditions and market opportunities.
- Households remain a critically important
social institution within which much diverse economic activity takes
place, investments are made and risks and incomes are pooled.
- There are both winners and losers from
the last 40 years of environmental, economic and social change.
- In general, farming systems have moved
towards more sustainable production systems, a finding which is the result
of actions by millions of small farmers and very rarely the result of
direct government or donor intervention.
- Customary tenure provides a fluid,
negotiated, dynamic set of institutions through which different groups try
to gain firmer claims to land, and which has provided no disincentive for
investment in agriculture.
- There have been enormous changes over
the last forty years, such as a growing scarcity of land, the
privatisation of certain resources (e.g. stubble) and the development of
new forms of collective resource management.
- Natural resources are only one part of a
broader livelihood system.
Question 1: Is a view of rural livelihood transformation as driven by capacities as well as by constraints a practicable basis for policy formation?
The group felt it is very important to shift from an approach emphasising constraints to one in which capacities provide the major focus. It was also thought that the term ‘opportunities’ is probably better than ‘capacities’. Such a shift challenges a techno-centred approach, in which constraints are identified from outside and solutions are drawn up, to one in which people are the principal actors. Constraints clearly exist, but they do not necessarily impose a firm cap on what people are able to achieve.
Question 2: What areas are critically important in constructing an enabling policy framework for livelihood development in the drylands?
A lot of time was spent discussing the role of the state – what minimal essential functions should it perform? It cannot be ignored and has a rightful place. A completely laissez-faire approach is not adequate. How can its responsibilities be redefined in ways which support local actors, rather than hindering them? Such responsibilities need to include:
- providing an enabling environment;
- negotiating, agreeing and enforcing the
rules of the game;
- providing certain public goods, such as
monitoring environmental change and data collection; equally, trying to
tackle certain issues where externalities are involved which require
higher level action – such as soil erosion. Also, there are certain
fundamental issues which need to be addressed at governmental level – such
as provision of basic water supplies;
- ensuring effective long-term management
strategies for certain assets whose degradation is irreversible;
- creating a level playing field by
providing an arena for trading off different objectives, e.g., is
environmental sustainability the key objective, and what trade-offs are
acceptable with meeting poverty eradication targets?;
- acknowledging the enormous power of markets
and prices, and the limited capacity of governments to intervene.
It is a fact that ‘policy’ cannot be defined in some neutral technocratic manner – policy inevitably needs to be linked to desired objectives, which itself needs to be negotiated between the various stakeholders involved. The political system needs to identify and agree objectives and priorities.
What single thing could government do to improve natural resource management (NRM)?
Governments could ensure more effective representation of different interests, help resolve conflicts, act as impartial arbitrator, create a greater sense of security. They could promote processes through which people can express their views and negotiate both with the state and with others.
It was felt that there is no evidence for governments having a longer time horizon than local people regarding NRM. If anything, government and politicians work within much shorter time-frames than local people, whose children and grandchildren will depend on the continued sustainability of certain resources.
Question 3: Recognising that politicians are influenced by interest groups, how can a participatory debate on enabling policy formation be initiated and sustained at national level?
Throughout the region, civil society organisations are playing a more important role, such as producer organisations, decentralised forms of local government, etc. These provide a means by which particular interests can be represented. But how can people in practice get their voices heard? What are the channels through which local people might be able to make their views heard? Participation is often largely cosmetic. Decentralisation equally does not necessarily provide the right structure and channels. People talk of empowerment, but what does this mean?
Is policy well informed? Often not - owing to an unwillingness to go out and seek ideas and views. How much does policy matter? It sets the broader framework within which people negotiate outcomes. Policy makers have a tendency to prefer tidy structures and solutions. In practice, life is rarely so simple. Hence, policy makers need to accept a degree of diversity and nonconformity, which reflects local circumstances. Government and donors need to become more demand-led. Yet their very organisation and structures tend to make this very difficult (spending targets, responsiveness to new initiatives, keeping up to date with the development jargon).
Group 2: Increasing the value of crop, livestock and other NR-based output
Members
Karim Hussein (Chairman) ODI Kate Longley
(Rapporteur) ODI Philippe Jouve CNEARC, France Adama Faye Bureau de Cooperation
Suisse, Senegal (ex-ISRA) Mamadou Faye Senegalese Embassy, UK Johan Brons
Wageningen University, Netherlands Mike Carr Crop Water Management Systems (Int)
Ltd Fred Zaal University of Amsterdam, Geography Irene Hoffman Giessen
University, Livestock Science
The importance of institutional development, in addition to technical development, for:
- professional producer organisations;
- production committees;
- regional organisations;
- international co-operation.
Question 1: Is a view of rural livelihood transformation as driven by capacities as well as by constraints a practicable basis for policy formation?
- Policy outcomes can be unexpected (both
beneficial and negative).
- Overcoming constraints at policy level
is often difficult – it is often better to build on local capacities.
- Information about the significance of
certain events or phenomena (e.g. price changes) at local level is needed,
to help local people to realise the implications and to evaluate and adapt
local strategies.
- Focus on sedentary production systems
makes it much easier to use the rural livelihood transformation approach.
Not enough attention is given to migratory/pastoralist production. What
about rangeland productivity?
- It is surprising that the Maradi paper
did not address the Fulani pastoralist situation where permanent
out-migration is part of a broader livelihood strategy.
- Rural livelihood transformation analysis
allows the analyst to understand how people manage in a crisis and what
the livelihood outcomes are. These outcomes can help to formulate policy,
e.g. land tenure arrangements based on ‘use’ (valorisation) of land, but
with the control of soil and water management on communal land.
- People want to exploit land but a lack
of financial resources prevent this (as in
- In
Constraints which pre-empt optimal productivity are complex (climatic, political, economic) and vary among different communities. If farmers don’t take up intensive farming practice, it is not because they don’t know how to, but because they lack the means, so we need to promote greater access to means of intensification. Overcoming constraints to access raises difficult and important questions:
- How can the private sector help?
- What is the gap left by the state?
- What is the role of producer
organisations?
- How can the state favour such
organisations and promote access to means of intensification?
- Have liberalisation policies increased
the risks to the producer?
- If you provide better infrastructure,
will this overcome technical constraints? Does technology disseminate
itself? We need to address technical constraints as well as
infrastructural problems.
- Problem of micro-macro articulation.
Question 2: What areas are critically important in constructing an enabling policy framework for livelihood development in the drylands?
Policies are often seen to be counter-productive, in that they may effectively prevent livelihood transformation, therefore the most effective enabling environment may be one in which the role of the state is reduced.
- Maybe the best enabling environment is
to leave the policy out altogether (i.e. extreme
decentralisation/democratisation) – politics can be completely
counter-productive to local regulatory functions.
- In situations of conflict, e.g., at the
"point of saturation" (i.e. population increase), when policies
are developed there are inevitably winners and losers, and new dynamics
and conflicts, e.g. north and south
- Current development ideas - e.g.,
participation, empowerment - do not make good policy in themselves. The
local-regional interface must be taken into account and the role of the
state.
- Can we promote regulation without state
intervention?
- Reliability/transparency of the state is
important.
- How can the state allow local processes
- It can provide a safe environment
through the provision of legal systems/security;
- The state should enable local
initiatives to flourish, e.g. communications, transport, infrastructure;
- The state should provide security and
freedom from threat;
- Rural-urban links should enable rural
producers to provide for larger urban populations;
- Low food prices are a major reason
preventing intensification – farmers have no incentive to increase production.
Even though the state no longer intervenes in pricing, globalised markets
may keep prices low due to cheap imports;
- Growth in urban demand can lead to an
expansion of agricultural activities, e.g., eggs and milk are in growing
demand, but this depends on the purchasing power of urban dwellers.
(However, in
- Western agricultural investment is often
heavily subsidised by government – the same cannot happen in
- Credit systems must be sustainable;
- Privatise input supply services, e.g.
artificial insemination (AI)
Mike Carr recounted experience based on tea projects in
- restructuring government services
towards privatisation was possible for cash crops such as tea, coffee,
etc., but in practice government may be reluctant to go down a
privatisation route even if that is official policy;
- government bureaucrats/civil servants
provided the biggest obstacle to change;
- an act of Parliament was eventually
initiated to privatise the research system;
- committees that incorporate a local and
long-term view are essential;
- countervailing powers are beneficial;
and
- communicating price information is
essential.
Question 3: Recognising that politicians are influenced by interest groups, how can a participatory debate on enabling policy formation be initiated and sustained at national level?
- Among the institutions at local or
national level, civil society, producers’ organisations, farmers’
organisations are the best placed to influence politicians.
- International co-operation at national
level helps a realisation that other countries share the same problems.
- Regional
organisations, e.g. Comité Permanent Inter-Etats de Lutte contre la
Sécheresse dans le Sahel (CILSS), provide a forum.
Group 3: Developing investment capacity and market access
Members
John English (Chairman) ex World Bank Polly
Gillingham (Rapporteur) HTS Development Ltd. Joseph Ayodele Ariyo (Resource
Person) Ahmadu Bello University, Nigeria Lucy Ambridge Department for
International Development (DFID) Kathy Baker School of Oriental and African
Studies Michael Barbour Retired Andrew Dorward Wye College Will Frost DFID,
Forestry APO Joos Koster Club du Sahel/OECD Valentina Mazzucato Economics,
University of Amsterdam Leen Molenaar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, DGIS,
Netherlands John Nelson Drylands Research Remco Oostendorp Free University,
Amsterdam, Economics
The discussion was wide-ranging and often diverged from the three key questions. The reported views expressed were not necessarily held unanimously:
Question 1: Is a view of rural livelihood transformation as driven by capacities as well as by constraints a practicable basis for policy formation?
The group agreed with the proposition, but had some discussion about the implications of the morning’s discussion and methodology.
- The presentation painted a rosy picture
of things not working out too badly for poor people. The analysis needs to
be more disturbing/shocking.
- In response, the research is showing
that government policy is having both a positive and negative impact. For
example, the Projet de Développement Rural du Département de Maradi (PDRM)
shows that markets are important in rural livelihood transformation, but
not everybody has access to markets.
- Given the conditions that small-scale
farmers operate in, they do their best.
- People who live in the four researched
areas are not at the bottom of the ladder in terms of poverty. There are
areas where people are much worse off, e.g., in the
- Questions were raised about methodology,
particularly how study villages and households were selected. It was
explained that selection was not random, but on a basis of agro-ecological
zone and available secondary and historical data. Similarly, households
were selected in order to get cross-sections of society. The important
factor was not the characteristics of the village data alone, but how it
varies according to external processes (e.g. devaluation, markets). Not
all of the work in
- John English concluded this discussion
by saying that the first study (Machakos) had started approximately 10
years ago with a focus on natural resource management issues. Areas were
selected on the basis of available data about the different
agro-ecological zones. Secondly, the aim was to marry a number of
different issues and studies.
Question 2: What areas are critically important in constructing an enabling policy framework for livelihood development in the drylands?
- It was generally agreed that markets
will develop wherever opportunities develop. The example was given of
livestock markets in Burkino Faso. Devaluation of the FCFA saw a huge
increase in the number of livestock markets without any external
intervention. The group agreed that the important thing is the development
of enabling conditions for markets rather than the markets themselves.
- There is a need to recognise the broader
influence of markets beyond just increasing commodity exchange – they also
provide opportunities for paid labour and alternative, non-land based
sources of income. In Benin, it was found that in the areas furthest from
the markets the most intensification of agriculture had occurred, because
closer to the market people had been influenced by the broader
opportunities offered by the market. It was agreed that this was an
important point as this discussion is concerned with developing
broad-based sustainable livelihoods rather than just agricultural
intensification alone.
- There is a need to support complementary
markets. For example, there might be a good market in fertilisers, but it
would work even better if finance markets worked so that more people could
get credit to afford the investment at the beginning of cropping season.
- Finance markets are crucial, in
particular the need to build confidence between government and the private
sector. The private sector needs a government that will support
infrastructural development but not interfere in the development of
markets themselves.
- There are many micro-level transactions
and local-level institutions, and we need to work through these as well as
the macro-level. In many areas social exchange is just as important as
commodity exchange. If we understand what is happening at the micro-level,
it will help us understand the impact of macro-level changes.
- It was asked whether we really should ‘rescue
these miserable parts of
- Stay put and invest in agriculture
- Stay put and diversify
- Migrate
It was argued that one of the purposes of this research should be to clarify what we need to do to help farming to remain a functional and viable option, and what policies are needed to achieve this.
Question 3: Recognising that politicians are influenced by interest groups, how can a participatory debate on enabling policy formation be initiated and sustained at the national level?
- If we are really to influence policy in
terms of its being understood and owned ‘in-country’, African ministers
and private sector actors from
- Offering choices requires a profound
change in the way we do aid. Lucy Ambridge introduced the example of the Uganda
Project for Modernisation of Agriculture. This is a very collaborative
process with a chain of discussion and feedback through national
government, local government and people themselves. There is ownership at
all levels, but it has so far taken more than three years and is still not
complete. DFID is changing the way it does aid – untying aid will be
important in this.
John English summed up as follows:
- The societies with which we work are
very much market-driven and will respond rapidly to market opportunities.
- Enabling markets require infrastructure
and sound financial markets.
- Other social mechanisms are also
important, and we need to work with these micro-level institutions.
There was some final discussion on the role of local government, which is not addressed specifically in the research papers. No major conclusions were reached, but there was one final passing shot: democracy has been disastrous for poor people as politicians follow populist policies rather than sound policies, and people do not necessarily elect the most competent people.
Group 4: Enhancing human resources and the non-farm sector
Members
Simon Batterbury (Chairman) London School of
Economics Pippa Trench (Rapporteur) SOS Sahel Deryke Belshaw School of
Development Studies, University of East Anglia Francis Gichuki University of
Nairobi Christian Lund University of
Question 1: Is a view of rural livelihood transformation as driven by capacities as well as by constraints a practicable basis for policy formation?
This question represents a false dichotomy and the group did not see a need for an ‘either/or’ approach. Starting with capacity avoids an elitist technocratic approach from dominating from the beginning but we need to look at constraints as well.
- We need to define where we are from the
beginning.
- There is a need to take into account
external factors, such as devaluation, in the region or in international
policies.
Deryck Belshaw said that a capacity approach acknowledges and validates indigenous knowledge, and in this respect, is similar to the participatory approach of development agencies, which also has drawbacks if taken alone. For example, communities alone may not be able to solve conflicts or constraints such as few, poor rural roads.
Question 2: What areas are critically important in constructing an enabling policy framework for livelihood development in the drylands?
We need to define what institutions we are talking about: these include private, community- and family-based organisations, NGO, governmental, parastatal institutions and interlinkages between them are fundamental.
Looking at service provision:
Local level institutions (e.g. harambees in
Decentralisation, which is an unstoppable process in
Looking at the relative advantages of different sources of service provision is to some extent a political debate (e.g. the relative advantages of public-private partnerships), but we can draw lessons all the same:
- Francis Gichuki said we need to look at
where existing models went wrong (e.g. parastatals) before coming up with
new ones.
- Some institutions are inherently more
accountable than others. Home-town associations have a massive potential
for sourcing finance and information, and their finance is often directed
to human resources (e.g., education). But individuals also have an
incentive to be accountable, for example so that they can retire as
respected members of the community. Should extensionists come from the
local area or from elsewhere?
- "Negative social capital" (or
criminality) cannot be ignored. Corruption plays a role in undermining
institutions at all levels, and investment. It has also led to a backlash
against politicisation of any ‘private’ institution because of the
potential for corruption.
- In
So on the question of prioritising policy:
- New policy comes in on top of old policy
and does not necessarily resolve the old problems.
- Policy is for whom, or what? In
- As the studies show, any policy will
always be renegotiated according to local needs, priorities, power
balances, and interests.
Taking this into account there was a consensus on two areas for policy prioritisation:
- Decentralisation to cope with the diversity of
environments (ecological, economic, etc.) that exist, and with this the
ability to allocate resources in a way which reflects this diversity.
- improving governance/accountability through incentives as well as
regulations.
Other policy ideas that were put forward but not fully debated included:
- support for urban and densely populated
areas in semi-arid regions, as a cost-effective way of boosting off-farm
income through trickle-back effects (but this does not resolve on-farm
capacity demands);
- streamlining costs rather than
off-loading the costs of the existing system on to civil society;
- continued education and adult learning
(information and communication).
Question 3 was not discussed
7 Concluding plenary and final remarks by Claude Raynaut
Claude Raynaut said the research has yielded a rich narrative through its historical approach. It shows that farmers are active, and have overcome huge constraints. There is consistency with Boserup’s hypothesis that people innovate and find solutions. People have a good memory of their locality - and of the promises they have heard before.
There is still a question over appropriate policies. External actions have contributed to constraints and vulnerability, which farmers must rectify. As we also are outsiders we should not make a list of priorities. If we want a single narrative it is that local situations are diverse, and the question is how to meet the challenge of this diversity, and give space to the strong dynamics which are at play and which are specific to the locality, and in which local people are the actors.
The important word is negotiation, and how to enhance negotiations between actors at different levels. Under what conditions can policy enhance the capacity of local people to make their voices heard, taking account of the contradictions within communities, and between communities and outsiders. The state has to play a role as guarantor and regulator of the rules of the game. We have to think in terms of processes rather than ready-made solutions.
8
Appendix: Participants (by 2004 some of these are out of date contacts)
|
NAMES |
INSTITUTION |
Email |
|
Bill Adams |
|
|
|
Lucy Ambridge |
NR Policy
Research ProgrammeRural Livelihoods Department DFID94 |
l-ambridge@dfid.gtnet.gov.uk |
|
Joseph Ayodele
Ariyo |
Department of
GeographyAhmadu Bello UniversityZariaNigeria |
|
|
Magatte Ba |
Centre de Suivi Ecologique (CSE), BP 15 532, Dakar-Fann, Senegal |
|
|
Kathy Baker |
Department of
Geography, |
|
|
Professor Michael
Barbour |
43 |
|
|
Dr Hazel Barrett |
Department of
Geography/ Centre of African studies, |
h.barrett@coventry.ac.uk |
|
Simon Batterbury |
DESTIN, LSE , |
s.batterbury
@lse.ac.uk |
|
Professor Deryke
Belshaw |
|
|
|
Laurent Bossard |
Club du Sahel, OECD 94 rue Chardon Lagache, 75016 Paris France |
|
|
Yamba Boubacar |
Faculté des Lettres et Sciences Humaines, Université Abdoul Moumoumi, BP
10960 Niamey, République du Niger |
|
|
David Bourn |
Environmental
Research Group Oxford Limited, |
|
|
Phil Bradley |
Department of
Geography, |
|
|
Professor M.K.V.
Carr |
Research,
Training & Consultancy Services Crop
and Water Management Systems (International) Ltd.,Fernbreck, 29, |
|
|
Grace Carswell |
AFRAS, |
|
|
Constance
Corbier-Barthaux |
Agence Française de Developpement, 5 Rue Roland Barthers, 75598, Paris
Cedex 12, France |
|
|
Sylvie Cordier |
Rural Policy and
Environment Group, Overseas Development Institute, |
|
|
Andrew Dorward |
Wye
College/Imperial, |
|
|
David M. Edwards |
Centre of African
Studies, |
|
|
John English |
|
|
|
James Fairhead |
|
|
|
Adama Faye |
Bureau d’Appui Cooperation Suisse 28 rue Asbane, Ndoye, Dakar, Senegal |
|
|
Will Frost |
Forestry |
|
|
Duncan Fulton |
SOS Sahel
International |
|
|
Francis N.
Gichuki |
Soil and Water
Management Programme, Department of Agricultural Engineering, |
|
|
Polly Gillingham |
HTS Development
Ltd,Thamesfield House, |
polly.gillingham@htsdevelopment.com |
|
Robin Grimble |
NRI |
mounthousegrimbles@supanet.co.uk |
|
H Hassan |
World Bank, |
|
|
Irene Hoffman |
Dept. of
Livestock Ecology, Justus-Liebig-University, Ludwigstr. 21, 35390 |
hoffmann@agrar.uni-giessen.de |
|
Katherine
Homewood |
Department of
Anthropology, |
|
|
Karim Hussein |
Rural Policy and
Environment Group, Overseas Development Institute, |
|
|
Philippe Jouve |
CNEARC , BP 5098,
34033 |
|
|
Joos Koster |
Club du Sahel/OECD, 94 rue Chardon Lagache, 75016 Paris, France |
|
|
|
Environment and
Policy Department, DFID, |
|
|
Melissa Leach |
Environment
Group, Institute of Development Studies, |
|
|
Richard Longhurst |
Evaluation
Manager, Commonwealth Secretariat, |
r.longhurst@commonwealth.int |
|
Kate Longley |
Overseas
Development Institute , |
|
|
Christian Lund |
|
|
|
Adam Manvell |
|
|
|
Simon Maxwell |
ODI , |
|
|
Dr Valentina
Mazzucato |
Economics and
Econometrics Faculty ,Development and Agricultural Economics , Free
University |
|
|
Kathleen Meagher |
|
kate.meagher@nuffield.oxford.ac.uk |
|
L. Molenaar |
Ministry of
Foreign Affairs , The |
leen.molenaar@minbuza.nl |
|
Michael Mortimore |
Drylands Research
, |
mikemortimore@compuserve.com |
|
James F. Morton |
HTS Development
Ltd. ,Thamesfield House , |
james.morton@htsdevelopment.com |
|
Dr Abdul Raufu
Mustapha |
Queen Elizabeth
House ,21 St Giles , |
|
|
John Nelson |
|
johnnelson@cableinet.co.uk |
|
David Niemeijer |
Environmental
Systems Analysis Group ,Department of Environmental Sciences , |
|
|
Dr Matthew Okai |
|
|
|
Remco Oostendorp |
De Boelelaan 1105
,1081 HV |
|
|
Henny Osbahr |
Department of
Geography , |
henny.osbahr@btinternet.com |
|
Philippe Ospital |
DGCID/DCT/EPS ,20 Rue Monsieur ,75007 PARIS ,France |
philippe.ospital@diplomatie.gouv.fr |
|
Adam Pain |
|
adam.pain@btinternet.com/ a.pain@uea.ac.uk
|
|
Fred Pearce |
|
|
|
John Pender |
International
Food Policy Research Institute , |
|
|
Claude Raynaut |
19 rue Pédroni
,33000, |
|
|
Ruerd Ruben |
Development
Economics Group , |
|
|
HE Mr Gabriel
Alexandre Sar |
Ambassador of |
g.sar@senegal.btinternet.com |
|
C.G. Thirtle |
T H |
|
|
Mary Tiffen |
Drylands Research
, |
mary@marytiff.demon.co.uk |
|
Camilla Toulmin |
International
Institute for Environment and Development , |
camilla.toulmin@iied.org
|
|
Pippa Trench |
SOS |
|
|
Dr Beryl Turner |
The Green ,
Litton, Skipton, |
|
|
Bruno Vindel |
Chef du Bureau des Politiques Agricoles Ministère des Affaires Etrangères
20 Rue Monsieur Paris, France |
bruno.vindel@diplomatie.fr |
|
Professor Andrew
Warren |
Department of Geography
, |
|
|
Christian
Webersik |
St Antony’s
College, |
|
|
Fred Zaal |
Human Geography, |
|
Access to Resources: Land Tenure
and Governance in Conference report by Simon Batterbury, simonpjb@unimelb.edu.au |
This workshop was the third in a series of ESRC-funded meetings on ‘Transformations
in African Agriculture’ and was convened by Phil Woodhouse of IDPM,
The first paper by Phil Woodhouse, ‘African Enclosures - the default mode of development’ issued a challenge in suggesting that African agrarian systems tend - in the absence of other constraints or processes - towards a ‘default’ of increasing individualization of production, and increasing commoditisation, over time. These processes are particularly marked in wetland areas that have been used for intensive agricultural production or grazing. Four wetland environments that have seen rapid change of land use in recent decades were studied in detail.
Phil argues that thee perspectives dominate writing on African land tenure systems
- Customary land rights, based on
membership of a social unit (family, lineage, or village) do not provide
‘security of tenure’ and thus act as a barrier to investment and hence to increasing
productivity, and need to be reformed.
- The negotiability and ambiguity of
rights is a positive feature of customary systems, because it means there
is always some opportunity for the poor to gain resource and land access
often through informal mechanisms and derived rights such as sharecropping
and loans.
- The negotiability and ambiguity of
rights is indeed a feature of African systems, but the default mode of
privatization of land actually increases inequality across societies,
because powerful social actors gain access or resources at the expense of
poorer actors. ‘Land to the buyer’ becomes the default mode.
Which of these perspectives was best supported by the case studies?
Woodhouse and his team studied an irrigated swamp in Kimana,
The politics of these changing access arrangements differ. Elite capture of the benefits of progressive privatization of resources appears in each case. However the cases exhibit a strong degree of local initiative, and therefore local political bargaining, without too much much involvement from the state or donors.
The four studies showed a diversity of land access mechanisms and variations
in the degree of privatization of the resource, but they lead Woodhouse to
support perspective 3 above, and to focus on the tendency of individualized or
privatised systems to actually increase - rather than diminish - socio-economic
differentiation. Clearly customary tenure has not been a barrier to investment
in the four cases - however neither has it protected the poor - it has not
permitted enhanced livelihoods to develop in an equitable fashion. Most
interestingly, in
The authors of African Enclosures argue that processes of socioeconomic differentiation are downplayed in populist writing on African land use systems, and in ‘sustainable livelihoods’ thinking which focuses on the strength of local initiative and local knowledge. In the book, it is suggested that arguments about the power of global discourses to dominate African policymaking (identified in African Enclosures with the IDS Environment group and their revisionist ‘Lie of the Land’ approaches) rightfully identify power inequalities in determining the fate of African landscapes, but fail to adequately explore the political economy of socio-economic differentiation, particularly between members of local communities. We need to better understand the implications of the ‘default mode’ through the tools of political economy and local level investigations - particularly the effects of market based access to land and water.
Comments from Christopher Clapham and the other workshop members reinforces this point, and moved the discussion onwards to consider political and fiscal decentralization programmes in Africa, which are trying to push decisionmaking ‘downwards’ to local bodies and to communities themselves. Would the communities’ studied in ‘African Enclosures’ be suitable targets for decentralized government structures? The participants had their doubts. Decentralization programmes, may - in theory - permit greater local governance of wetlands in dry lands. Yet the case studies showed that de facto local governance was already in place, and this was often exclusionary and conflictual. We cannot assume that poverty reduction or equity will emerge from vesting power with local communities and their leaders - this is a very naive assumption. Clapham stressed that there is a strong reason lying behind decentralisation efforts - the manifest failure of many African central states to govern effectively and to respect human rights. But notions of good governance still take their cue from an erroneous, and western-inspired view of accountability and politics – basically that civil society is worthy of support. What constitutes civil society, however, is rarely fully understood - in fact the range of actors is diverse, and not always separate from the state of from business. So there are ranges of "unintended consequences of well intentioned actions" under the guise of decentralization. Three issues will not go away, and will stymie efforts to vest control in local communities:
- Conflicts internal to communities over
resources will be exacerbated or repressed by decentralization. Local
power structures are unequal, and contain significant age and gender biases
that will endure.
- Conflict between ‘indigenous’ and
‘immigrant’ or ‘outsider’ communities are widespread. Dissent over land
access can be particularly hard to handle in these conditions.
Decentralization can vest more power in ’indigenous’ leaders to exclude
others. As David Hulme argues, political leaders ‘play’ with ethnicity and
social differentiation.
- There is also a clash between holders of
rights to land – often local people - and a range of ‘providers’ of rights
external to communities - particularly governments and NGOs. He argued
that the state is always needed to counterbalance local political conflict
over land and to manage the activities of NGOs etc. External providers
like NGOs act as a magnet for local people, and can create competition.
Clapham proposed that customary authorities are a ‘screen’ behind which other things happen - processes of exploitation, as well as the mediation and resolution of conflicts. We need to penetrate this screen. However we must also be wary - if, under devolved governance, ‘rights’ to land or resources were rendered more transparent and clear cut, would the poor be able to negotiate and retain informal or derived rights? Unlikely. Clapham feels the only option facing us is to abandon western models of equity and good governance, and to ‘go with the flow’ (view 3 of land reform above), even if this means tacit acceptance of the ‘default mode’ as an actually existing model for social and economic change.
In the discussion there was agreement, following Henry Bernstein, that
‘access to land is not enough’ - the studies revealed that access to labour, to
materials, to health, and other social and material goods is also paramount in
addressing rural poverty. It was also very clear, as he argued, that a national
level politics often lies behind land tenure reform and decentralisation of
governance - witness the racial and economic disputes that have affected land
reform in
Camilla Toulmin of IIED presented a paper on ‘Identifying a research agenda for the reform of land tenure’ that bravely proposed some avenues for future research and policy reform, in the light of the realities of politicized land access and tenure struggles. She also suggested that land access conditions have tightened over time for rural people - for example in West Africa, elders will no longer allocate land to young men in the community without question (creating exclusion), and these youth sometimes rebel against working without pay on the family farm for several years (leading to individualisation). In areas of strong immigration, local villagers are trying to reclaim land already given to immigrant farmers. In these conditions, domestic groups are fragmenting (one part of Woodhouse’s 'default mode') with short-term calculation of economic advantage often replacing reciprocity as a driving principle of household decision-making. But people need to negotiate a complex path to ensure land access, sometimes resorting to fictive documents issued by local leaders or personages, that lack legal authority, to ‘claim’ land as theirs. There is therefore a ‘plurality of norms’ for assuring land access.
There is also confusion in several countries about the mechanisms proposed
under decentralisation programmes. IIED efforts – which hare sponsored by DFID
and other donors, and are some of the most important research and publications
programmes currently ongoing in
Andrew Shepherd picked up on the decentralisation theme in Camilla’s paper. He shared many of the participants’ skepticism around ‘devolution of powers over land and other activities’; suggesting devolved powers are often captured by powerful elites. Yet devolution of other powers than over land - for example over health or education - may yield greater success.
A surprising turn to the discussion, and one very important to land tenure
policy, is over the new geography of African citizenship. As Camilla
noted In Ivory Coast, Ivoriens are ranking their Ivorien identity - often
invented - well above that of the long term and short term Burkinabé migrants
that provide the majority of labour on the country's plantations, and who fill
many urban jobs. In a situation of political turmoil, Burkinabés are being
ejected or are leaving the country voluntarily, amidst harassment and loss of
livelihood (of course such harrasment has been seen before in Africa - in
In conclusion, the meeting broadly supported Phil Woodhouse's/Henry Bernstein's thesis that the default mode of changing land use in much of Africa is individualization and commercialization of production, and agreed than this posed big problems for social differentiation and therefore for policy that purports to be driven by equity considerations. While it could be argued that some people gain from commercialization and make more money or increase their stability from it, similarly, other people nearly always lose. Recent studies such as Sara Berry's 'Chiefs know their boundaries' (James Currey/Heinemann 2000) illustrate this point very well. African Enclosures – a term not all the workshop participants were happy with - describes sometimes a territorial, and sometimes a social or ethnic exclusion from wetlands in dry lands.
In thinking through future avenues for research and policy formulation, we need to (following David Hulme and Camilla Toulmin):
- Develop long-term research and
monitoring programmes
- WHen thinking through decentralisation:
begin with decentralisation of services, before moving to more tricky
issues like land allocation later, if appropriate
- Conduct political ethnographies of power
and institutions
- Do not overestimate bureaucratic and
administrative capacities at the local level, or their ability to set
aside ethnic or historical claims.
There were 20 people at this stimulating and timely event. A partial list:
1.
Phil
Woodhouse IDPM,
2.
David
Hulme IDPM,
3.
Simon
Batterbury DESTIN, LSE
4.
Camilla
Toulmin, IIED
5.
Judy
Longbottom, IIED and DFID land tenure
6.
Henry
Bernstein, SOAS
7.
Andrew
Clayton, Christian Aid
8.
Ros
Duffy,
9.
Christopher
Clapham,
10. Andrew Shepherd, Univ of
11. Sam Hickey, Univ of
12. Chasca Twyman, Univ of
13. Susie Jacobs,
14. IDPM students and researchers
15. Henry’s PhD student
Change
in the
Simon Batterbury
Lennart Olsson
Andrew Warren
We held a small, 2-day workshop in
The workshop was one of a series on agricultural change in the
We discussed changes in the
We see four hypotheses to explain these increases in vegetation greenness:
1. rainfall
2. change in vegetation composition from trees to grass
3. soil effects (improvements at different rates on sandy or clay soils,
for example)
4. land use changes
We are in process of testing the first three of these hypotheses, but
believe it unlikely that their influence will be great. Our main concern in the
workshop was to assemble a group of experts on land use and population change
for the various clusters of significant changes according to the satellite
data: southern
At the
meeting we developed three stages to the study:
A. Establishing
and verifying the NDVI pattern.
1. maximum each year (already done
by Lennart)
2. Time-integrated analyses
a. 3 weeks - maximum 3
weeks ?+ (Michael)
b. July-August September
(Michael)
c. growing season + zenith
corrections (Lars)
d. quality control
(Michael ???)
3. timing of changes (already done
by Lennart)
B. Biophysical
relations of changes
1. Rainfall (already far advanced by
Lennart)
2. Soil (sandy/non-sandy) (Jonas and
Andrew)
3. IGBP land cover or other land
cover comparisons (Jonas)
These
are all to be ready for the March meeting
C. Analyses of the relations of the
pattern to readily available social data
1. population (the WRI data base)
(Lennart ?)
2. settlements, roads etc. (Lennart ?)
At
some later stage
D. Case studies of areas illustrating
particular trajectories, the exact location to be decided in November
Changing modes of governance and their local
impacts - tracing the links".
AAG meeting, March 2002
This set of papers examined the effects of changing
modes of governance and institutional arrangements - particularly those
instigated by the state, and associated with decentralization and local
empowerment - upon the inhabitants and the environments of particular places. The
contributors use a range of research techniques to understand the local
outcomes of models including neoliberal political decentralization, increased
local government autonomy, community management of natural resources, and land
reform. We ask, in particular, how such outcomes are locally
negotiated/resisted.
Deconcentration, devolution, and hollowing-out of
state functions are all on the international development agenda at the present
time, and have major implications for localities in the developed and developing
worlds. Yet their impacts (material, economic, symbolic, ecological) are
difficult to assess since they traverse the 'chain' of scales linking 'state'
to 'locality'. Work in various fields - particularly in institutional theory,
the new economic and environmental geography, and the political economy of
development, have offered new theoretical and methodological insights, and some
fascinating empirical material.
The papers here are written by scholars with some
links to the academic discipline of geography, and therefore the ‘jumping of
scales’ in neo-liberal governance reforms receives particular attention.
Publication
plans
1)
Introduction:
2) Corrupt Decentralization or Decentralized Corruption? Geographies of
Rent-Seeking in Rural
Rene Véron, Assistant Professor,
Geography,
Based on work carried out with Stuart Corbridge
funded by the UK ESRC, 1998-2000.
Abstract:
A common rationale for political decentralization is to increase the state’s
accountability to its citizens in order to reduce corruption. For instance,
locally elected officials are seen to be ‘closer’ to ordinary people and,
therefore, less likely to adopt rent-seeking practices. This paper examines
this presumption through the analysis of extensive village studies and
interviews with officials and politicians in rural
3) Participation, sustainability
and devolution – or kleptocracy, privatisation and degradation? Resource
management in four African countries.
Piers M. Blaikie, Professor of
Development Studies, University of
Based on work carried out for a UK
DfID project on conservation policy.
Abstract:
Why do the notions of common property resource (CPR) management, devolution,
decentralization and local democracy feature so prominently in the policies and
programmes of many east and central African countries, when results are so
poor, and the tide of de facto and de jure privatisation, pervasive kleptocracy
and resource degradation has been coming in for so many years? How do senior
people in national governments react to these policies, and what strategies do
they follow in the face of threats to centralized conduits of revenue and
inducement?. There are also other political games to be played between aid
institutions and national governments, which often have a sort of discursive
momentum of their own and run counter to what is actually going on ( e.g. de
jure and de facto privatisation of CPRs, increasing usurping control by
bureaucratic bourgeoisies and new political entrepreneurs in the countryside;
the shifting of aid money out of NGOs into sectoral programmes and back into
the so recently discredited state). The paper discussed these trends.
4) "Conflicts over governance: decentralization
in
Part
of www.crisisstates.com work at the LSE – a development research centre funded
by DfID
Abstract:
5) "State, culture, and landscape transformation in
Hong
Jiang, Assistant professor, Geography, Univ of Wisconsin-Madison
Abstract:
As a centralized state,
6) Indigenous
Autonomy and Nature Conservation in
Karl Offen, Assistant Professor,
Geography,
Abstract:
Over the course of the last decade, indigenous and black autonomy movements
have begun to transform the political and conservation geography of
7) Contested
Timber: Logging, Traditional Harvest, and the Making of an Indigenous Political
Movement.
Abstract:
This presentation examines the conflict between Maya villagers and logging
interests over the remaining stands of old-growth tropical forest in southern
8) Rethinking ‘Neo-Marshallian Nodes in Global Networks’: Governance
Dilemmas in the Transborder Euregios.
Olivier T. Kramsch, research fellow, Centre for Borders Research,
Katholieke Universiteit Nijmegen.
Status:
draft written
Abstract:
Since the early 1990s the European Union has invested heavily in the
construction of cross-border regions -- alternately referred to as euregios,
euregions or euroregions -- running along the dorsal spine of its former
national political frontiers. Infused with the continent’s hopes of achieving
integration “in miniature”, Europe’s euregios have thus been saddled with the
difficult task of reconciling and stabilizing a number of contradictions
afflicting the wider European “project”: the improvement of efficiency
conditions for transnational regimes of accumulation at the level of the EU;
the protection and nurturing of local “cultures”; and the creation of viable
democratic institutions at the sub-national scale capable of attenuating the
neo-liberal effects of welfare-state retrenchment in the provision of basic
public entitlements and services. In this, the drama of governance within the
euregios is indistinguishable from that urban and regional devolution dynamics
operating within a national European framework.
Yet in
this paper I argue that the cross-border dimension of European euregios demands
a further reframing of the categories traditionally used to apprehend the
possibilities for democratic governance at para-state levels, expanding our
conception of political community grounded in notions of citizenship, rights,
obligations and the spatial parameters of the moral economy. Precisely because
the state cannot be “taken for granted” as the final arbiter of social equity
and “voice” in setting territorial development priorities within the
multinational euregios, a new socio-spatial imaginary is required to represent
effective social relations within transborder regional milieux which in some
respects echo those demanded at supra-national and global scales. Revisiting
the ideas of T.H. Marshall on the bases of constructive citizenship and a body
of critical international relations theory, the author draws on recent
fieldwork examining the operations of one of the oldest cross-border
parliamentary institutions in Europe -- located within the tri-cultural and
tri-lingual Maas-Rhein euregio (encompassing Netherlands, Germany and Belgium)
– to develop a conceptual language capable of addressing the possibilities and
perils of governance within a territorial frame that is inadequately captured
by a recently developed urban-centered literature. In short, it proposes that
the “right to the city”, at least in an emergent and expanding
9) "Environmental
Institutions and Non-governmental Organizations on the U.S.-Mexico
Border."
Diana Liverman, Professor, Department of Geography and
Regional Development,
Abstract:
In the last decade the U.S.-Mexico border region, particularly on the Mexican
side, has experienced dramatic changes in economic and political structure,
land and water rights, and levels of local activism. Partly in response to
critics of NAFTA, new environmental institutions (BECC, CEC, and Border XXI)
and citizens’ organizations were established to monitor and mitigate
environmental problems in the border region requiring unprecedented levels of
local input and public participation in
10) Local capacity, village governance and the
political economy of rural development in
Leni Dharmawan, Social Development Group, World Bank,
Abstract
This
paper develops a framework for conceptualizing local capacity to address
village level livelihood and governance problems. The framework is based on an analysis of
asset distribution, combined with an explicit analysis of the links between processes
of state formation, state-business linkages and local forms of social
capital. The framework is used to
discuss findings from recent research on village capacity in rural
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